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mental organizations (“NGOs”). In recent decades the number, size, and
impact of international NGOs have expanded greatly.1 Private voluntary
entities regularly work collaboratively with individuals, key government
policymakers, multinational corporations, and major intergovernmental
institutions on issues of importance to the organization, including emergency humanitarian relief, conflict resolution, economic and social development, environmental protection and sustainability, political consciousness-raising about human and civil rights, and monitoring national
and transnational actors.2 Although NGOs do not have the law-making
authority of the state, their ability to generate what scholars call “soft”
law, through campaigning, mobilization, advocacy, lobbying, agendasetting, and negotiation, is widely acknowledged and put to effective
use.3 In some instances, certain societal challenges are left almost entirely to the charitable sector to resolve because neither governments nor
private businesses are able or willing to act.4 As a result, NGOs have become a powerful force in global governance.5 According to President Bill
Clinton:
The impact of . . . three trends—the growth of civil society in the developing world, the vast pool of new wealth available for giving, and
the rising influence of small donors—has been reinforced by the proven
ability of NGOs of all sizes and missions to have a positive effect on
problems at home and abroad, often in partnership with governments
and local NGOs in developing countries.6
1. ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS: AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN
PHILOSOPHERS AND NGOS 1 (Keith Horton & Chris Roche eds., 2010).
2. See Shamima Ahmed, The Impact of NGOs on International Organizations:
Complexities and Considerations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 817, 817 (2011).
3. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Commentary: Privately Generated Soft Law in International Governance, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 166, 166–69
(Thomas J. Biersteker et al. eds., 2007); Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking
NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
1011, 1013 (2011); see generally Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft
Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94
MINN. L. REV. 706, 795–96 (2010).
4. Cf. Richard Steinberg, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in THE
NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, 117, 119–25 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (summarizing economics literature explaining nonprofits
as a response to market and government failures); Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation
Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1121
(2007) (“Nonprofit organizations occupy a critical space between society’s private and
public spheres.”).
5. See Alyssa A. Dirusso, American Nonprofit Law In Comparative Perspective, 10
WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 39, 40 (2011).
6. BILL CLINTON, GIVING: HOW EACH OF US CAN CHANGE THE WORLD 11 (2007).
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Yet critical voices from both the left and the right, private organization
“watch” projects, and governments are actively seeking to curb the growing power of nonprofit organizations.7 International nonprofits, often
criticized for a lack of accountability and legitimacy, are increasingly
under attack.8
This Article examines the rise of the growing anti-NGO movement.
Still modest in size and scope, this movement receives little systematic
study and academic attention. This Article thus takes a closer look at the
nature and validity of the critiques directed at NGOs. In doing so, it considers the emergent dynamics between two different types of nonprofit
organizations: larger donor organizations primarily located in the Global
North (i.e., industrialized countries, primarily in Europe and North
America) and smaller, grant-receiving “Southern NGOs,” a term used for
organizations operating in less-developed countries (whether in the
southern hemisphere or not) that usually work on international development issues. Although some of the critiques around NGO representativeness and voice may have poignancy, the typically proposed solution—
greater accountability—actually exacerbates the problem. Ironically, as
Northern funders attempt to exert control over grantmaking activities to
enhance their own accountability, they may also unwittingly weaken the
accountability and legitimacy claims of the NGOs they fund. Furthermore, this destructive cycle dilutes the transformative potential of localized civic action and civil society.
Sometimes referred to as the “independent sector,” “nonprofit sector,”
“charitable sector,” or “third sector,” nonprofit entities are, in many
ways, hybrids of their public- and private-sector counterparts. In some
respects nonprofits resemble for-profit corporate entities to the extent
that nonprofits are “private, independent, autonomous enterprises,”9 but
also resemble public sector organizations in their commitment and dedication (in both a moral and legal sense) to advancing the public good (as
the supporters may define it).
One critical difference, however, is that nonprofit organizations exist
without clear lines of accountability. Corporate and government power
each have clear and formal measures of accountability. Corporate power
is constrained by shareholders who own equity in the companies. Gov7. See infra Part II.
8. See, e.g., Mari Fitzduff & Cheyanne Church, Stepping Up to the Table: NGO
Strategies for Influencing Policy on Conflict Issues, in NGOS AT THE TABLE 1, 10–12
(Mari Fitzduff & Cheyanne Church eds., 2004).
9. Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How
Public Is Private Philanthropy?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 573 (2010).
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ernment power, at least in the case of democratically controlled governments, is held to account through voting of the collective citizenry. The
nonprofit sector, however, lacks equivalent accountability mechanisms.10
This absence of formal accountability contributes to anxiety about or
mistrust of the third sector, especially when its activities begin to cross
national borders.
Much has been written examining the rise, risks, claims, and lessons of
the anti-globalization11 and anti-corporate movements.12 Yet less prominent is the parallel criticism about societal threats stemming from the
role and influence of humanitarian and international NGOs. The existence of such critics may be especially surprising because Northern NGOs
have gained significant recognition for their effective work,13 are
10. See PETER FRUMKIN, ON BEING NONPROFIT 5–6 (2002); Evelyn Brody, Agents
Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 489 (1996); Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen
M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 82–85 (2005); see also Dana Brakman Reiser,
Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795, 813 (2007)
[hereinafter, Brakman Reiser, Director Independence] (noting that the nonprofit context
lacks “clear lines of accountability”).
11. See, e.g., DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREW, GLOBALIZATION/ANTIGLOBALIZATION: BEYOND THE GREAT DIVIDE (2d ed. 2007); Evan E. Hillebrand, Deglobalization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?, 10 GLOBAL ECON. J. 1, 5 (2010) (describing
anti-globalization efforts and suggesting such efforts are the product of nations and powerful economic groups seeking to protect domestic interests); Erika George, See No Evil?
Revisiting Early Visions of the Social Responsibility of Business: Adolf A. Berle’s Contribution to Contemporary Conversations, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 965, 979 (2010) (suggesting corporations must become champions of societal good in response to the growing
anti-globalization movement against corporate expansion).
12. See, e.g., EVAN OSBORNE, THE RISE OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENT (2007);
Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 86 (2010); see also Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood:
How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 525–34 (2010) (tracing the history of anti-corporate sentiment in colonial America and Europe).
13. See, e.g., Lisa Schenck, Climate Change “Crisis”–Struggling for Worldwide
Collective Action, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 355 (2008) (discussing
NGO contributions in the area of international environmental law); Charles Trueheart,
Medical Aid Group Wins Nobel Prize; Doctors Without Borders Treats Victims, Pushes
Peace, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1999, at A1 (noting that the international relief agency
which is officially known by its French name, Médecins Sans Frontières, won the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1999); Felice D. Gaer, Foreword to SUBCONTRACTING PEACE: THE
CHALLENGES OF NGO PEACEBUILDING, at xv (Oliver P. Richmond & Henry F. Carey eds.,
2005) (“Non-governmental organizations and other local actors have conducted some of
their most valuable and effective work over the years in the area of peacebuilding . . .
This was not always the case.”).
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acknowledged as important contributors to civil society,14 have expanded
their global reach, and have become more widely known among the general public.15 Indeed, public opinion data show that NGOs are widely
respected and trusted. In an annual worldwide survey of opinion shapers,
NGOs are regularly found to command the highest levels of trust among
major institutions.16
Despite, or perhaps because of, the new visibility of NGOs, they also
have been the subject of intense criticism. The rise in anti-NGO rhetoric
and activity would be of little interest if it represented a fringe view.
However, the critics are also found in the mainstream: public officials
have expressed concerns about NGO influence,17 development scholars
have questioned the value of foreign aid and the value of the work conducted by nonprofit organizations,18 and influential journalists also raised
14. See Nina J. Crimm, The Moral Hazard of Anti-Terrorism Financing Measures: A
Potential To Compromise Civil Societies and National Interests, 43 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 577, 579 (2008); Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits,
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 291 (2004); Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic
Security, and International Philanthropy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 773, 789 (2007) [hereinafter
Jenkins, Soft Power].
15. See James McGann & Mary Johnstone, The Power Shift and the NGO Credibility
Crisis, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 159, 160; Jim Bencivenga, Critical Mass, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 3, 2000, at 15.
16. See Latraviette Smith, 2011 Edelman Trust Barometer Findings, EDELMAN 11
(2011),
http://www.edelman.com/trust/2011/uploads/Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Globa
l%20Deck.pdf [hereinafter EDELMAN] (noting that, in the firm’s annual survey gauging
attitudes about the state of trust, NGOs are the most trusted institution in comparison to
business, government, and media across twenty-three countries from 2008–2011).
17. See, e.g., Elaine L. Chao, U.S. Sec’y of Labor, Address at the Federalist Society’s
National Lawyers Convention Sessions (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20070924_Chao2003NLC.pdf (“[S]pecial interest agendas [of NGOs] tend
to reflect a narrow rather than a broad spectrum of public opinion” and “transparency and
accountability are more important than ever before in international organizations”); see
also Steve Charnovitz, Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations in Global
Governance, in NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, & INNOVATIONS 21, 24–25
(Lisa Jordan & Peter Van Tuijl eds., 2006) (discussing John Bolton’s statements—made
while serving as Senior Vice President for the American Enterprise Institute—that claim
NGOs “see [themselves] as beyond national politics . . . [which has] profoundly antidemocratic implications” and compare the NGO system to fascism by suggesting “Mussolini would smile on the Forum of Civil Society.”).
18. See generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S
EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006) (criticizing Western aid to the developing world as ineffective at best and harmful at worst);
Amy J. Cohen, Thinking With Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 511,
571 (2009); Paul Wapner, Democracy and Social Movements, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 305, 306 (2003) (discussing criticism of NGOs by scholars).
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alarms about NGOs and their work.19 Further, some evidence suggests
that despite the goodwill toward NGOs,20 support may be softening.21
The anti-NGO movement is emerging as a force with which to be
reckoned. What does this movement mean for those concerned about
civil society and for those who value the unique contributions of the
nonprofit sector? To begin to answer this question, it is important to understand the various arguments against nonprofit organizations and the
creation of pockets of resistance to nonprofit organizations and where
they might lead. By beginning to fill in the gap in literature about the
growing opposition to nonprofit organizations and their role in global
governance, this Article hopes to shed light on debates about nonprofit
accountability and legitimacy. Another aim of this Article is to mine the
critiques for insights and to suggest ways government policy makers and
foundation trustees and managers can establish regulations and implement international philanthropy in ways that support NGOs without emboldening their critics.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the history and
background of NGOs, discussing what a nongovernmental organization
is and why it is being criticized. It also addresses the concept of accountability as applied to NGOs and attempts to unravel the term’s many different meanings and strands. Part II describes the wide range of antiNGO activities and voices and the typical claims leveled against such
organizations. This part examines organized public relations campaigns
led by the political right, academic dissent on the left, and anti-NGO
lawmaking and political activity by governments on several continents
that have sought to limit NGO involvement in policy matters. In sifting
through the various arguments and critiques of NGOs, a troubling concern emerges: how to ensure that NGOs formed to reflect the participation, authenticity, and voice of a wide range of interested peoples actually do so, rather than becoming beholden to global elites or outside experts. Part III discusses the implications for the future. In particular, the
19. See, e.g., William Booth, International Charities Fall Short in Haiti, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2011, at A6 (suggesting that NGOs have become “hobbled by poor coordination,
high turnover and a lack of transparency” and “[c]harity groups have been working in
Haiti for decades . . . but the country is worse off economically than it was during the
dark days of dictator[ship].”); Editorial, Holding Civic Groups Accountable, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2003, at A18 (“[NGOs] owe it to the public to be accountable and transparent
themselves.”); Mary Beth Sheridan, In Aid for Plan for Haiti, U.S. to Rebuild from Government Outward; New Approach Relies more on Statecraft, Less on Web of NGOs,
WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2010, at A8 (claiming the dependence of Haiti on NGO-provided
aid has led to an “atrophied central government”).
20. Cf. EDELMAN, supra note 16, at 11 and accompanying text.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 94–99.
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insights gained from a deeper understanding of the anti-NGO fears and
criticisms suggest that law, public policy, and governance pressures
might presently be working to exacerbate, rather than to alleviate, some
of the concerns.
Although I question much of the criticism, disagree with the conclusions, and reject the policy prescriptions of the anti-NGO movement, I
appreciate the effort to expose conflicts that arise when philanthropy becomes more about serving funders and less about encouraging selfdevelopment. One clear message emerges from this critical examination:
it is a mistake to ignore the anti-NGO critics and their arguments. For
supporters of NGOs, the weight of the anti-NGO discourse and lawmaking will neither discredit international nonprofit activity nor lead participants to disengage. Rather, it may lead to productive reform. For example some large funders and operating charities may reconsider how their
own behavior—especially their aggressive control over programming
and policies—may threaten the independence of smaller nonprofits and
citizens’ groups. Ironically, much of the anti-NGO discourse may end up
serving to remind Northern NGOs that if their support is to have a transformative impact, they must empower those closest to the problems.
Moreover, reconsideration of grantmaking practices and behaviors that
reinforce the dominance of Northern funders over the subservience of
Southern NGOs may take on a new sense of urgency in light of a looming anti-NGO threat.
I. UNDERSTANDING NGOS
Over the past decade and a half, NGOs have risen in the public consciousness, and are now a part of everyday conversation. Today an idealistic young person who seeks to change the world often wants to work
for an NGO. Despite such visibility and ubiquity, the term “nongovernmental organization” is still confusing to some, lacking a consistent and
settled definition.22
Nonprofit organizations are critically important contributors to civil
society.23 NGOs generally represent people apart from, and sometimes
against, the state. In addition to the traditional roles associated with
22. See SHAMIMA AHMED & DAVID M. POTTER, NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 8–
9 (2006).
23. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 571–78 (1998); Lakshman Guruswamy, State Responsibility in Promoting Environmental Corporate Accountability, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 231 (2010); Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14,
at 789; Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of Internally
Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 830–31, 867–74 (2003).
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cross-border and locally-based organizations in the developing world
such as basic disaster relief, the work of the modern NGO also may include economic and social development,24 political advocacy,25 public
education and awareness,26 agenda setting,27 political representation and
enforcement,28 and corporate monitoring and reporting,29 among other
activities. In contrast to corporations that represent business interests,
NGOs have been described as “people’s organizations.”30
Although there may be a tendency to think of NGOs as a monolithic
collective, individual organizations vary considerably. The interests of
NGOs vary widely. For instance, NGOs may provide direct basic services, organize communities to formulate solutions to problems, or advocate the implementation of particular policies.31 They focus on a wide
range of activities and differ in their organizational structures and
sources of support. Most NGOs receive funding from one or more
sources, including donations, grants, contracts, fees for services, product
sales, and membership dues.32 They may be centrally organized or loose24. See HELMUT K. ANHEIER & LESTER M. SALAMON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 2 (1998); Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 790.
25. See MARC LINDENBERG & CORALIE BRYANT, GOING GLOBAL: TRANSFORMING
RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT NGOS 173–206 (2001).
26. See David Moore, Safeguarding Civil Society in Politically Complex Environments, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., June 2007, at 3, 7–11.
27. See Masudul K. Biswas, Developmental Issues in News Media: NGO-Media Interaction in Bangladesh, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., June 2007, at 77, 85–86; Dinah
Shelton, International Human Rights Law: Principled, Double, or Absent Standards?, 25
LAW & INEQ. 467, 482–83 (2007).
28. See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human
Rights Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911 (2011) (analyzing NGOs’
human rights enforcement activities via the European Court of Human Rights, InterAmerican Human Rights Commission, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights).
29. See Gerald Keim, Nongovernmental Organizations and Business-Government
Relations: The Importance of Institutions, in GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS 19, 19 (Jonathan
P. Doh & Hildy Teegen eds., 2003).
30. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 312 (2000) (citation omitted);
Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental
Organizations and the Case For Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 280 n.80
(2004) [hereinafter Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs?] (discussing the use of the
term the term “international people’s organizations”).
31. See Sarah Ben Néfissa, Introduction: NGOs and Governance in the Arab World:
A Question of Democracy to NGOS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB WORLD 1, 31 (Sarah
Ben Néfissa et al. eds., 2005).
32. See Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle, Scope and Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 66,
74–75 (describing common revenue sources in the nonprofit sector).
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ly affiliated through federation structures. In general, this large and diverse universe of organizations operates at local, national, and international levels.
A. Overview and Terminology
Nongovernmental organizations have existed for centuries and have
held a celebrated place in history,33 but the term NGO is relatively
young. Many academics trace the origin of the term “nongovernmental
organization” to shortly after World War II.34 Most significantly, the
United Nations adopted the term in 1945 when it referred to “nongovernmental organizations” in its Charter35 to describe “a vast range of
international and national citizens organizations, trade unions, voluntary
associations, research institutes, public policy centers, private government agencies, business and trade associations, foundations and charitable endeavors.”36 Specifically, the Charter delegated the responsibility
for making “suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations” to the U.N. Economic and Social Council.37
Today, “NGO” continues to be an expansive term that refers to a formal organization that is neither a government nor a corporate institution,
but rather a voluntary association within civil society.38 As Professor
Thomas Kelley observed, “Global North actors consider NGOs as either

33. See, e.g., 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 489, 492 (Harvey
C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1840).
34. See, e.g., Kerstin Martens, Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations, 13 VOLUNTAS: INT’L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORG. 271, 271 (2002). But
see Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 22 (suggesting the term was used as early as 1920, after
the negotiation of international labor treaties, to describe the groups that were excluded
from negotiations).
35. See Martens, supra note 34, at 271; U.N. Charter art. 71; SERGEY RIPINSKY &
PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, NGO INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (2007) (recognizing that the United Nations introduced the term
“non-governmental organization” in its Charter).
36. Angus Archer, Methods of Multilateral Management: The Interrelationships of
International Organizations and NGOs, in THE US, THE UN, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
GLOBAL CHANGE 303, 303 (Toby Trister Gati ed., 1983).
37. U.N. Charter art. 71. It is important to note that entities similar to NGOs—such as
associations of individuals that fought for the abolition of slavery in the United States—
existed before this formal recognition, but were not labeled as “NGOs.”
38. See generally ANN C. HUDOCK, NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 1 (1999) (“[NGOs are]
those organizations outside the realm of government, and distinct from the business
community.”); Martens, supra note 34 (analyzing the term “NGO” from a legal and sociological perspective in an attempt to arrive at a holistic definition).
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essential to or the alter ego of civil society.”39 Of course, as Professor
Kelley accurately notes, civil society is a “flexible” and “malleable” concept.40 From my perspective, civil society represents a capacious framework of civic values encompassing the space, the set of institutions, the
organizations, the networks, and the behaviors situated between the state,
the business world, and the family. Civil society facilitates exchanges
among citizens, enables communication channels between citizens and
the state, promotes civic action, and advances common interests based on
civility.
As a subset of civil society organizations,41 NGOs are private and voluntary, practicing self-governance, and are organized around a common
mission. Characterized by their voluntary status, NGOs may function on
a small scale, with a primary focus on domestic concerns or on a global
scale with transnational operations.
In the United States, although the terms “nonprofit organization” and
“nongovernmental organization” are virtually synonymous, the term
“nonprofit” is usually used to indicate a domestic organization. By contrast, the term NGO is used to refer to organizations in either the Global
North or South that work in less-developed, aid-receiving countries. In
contrast, the term “nonprofit” is usually used for domestic entities. For
example, the League of Women Voters or Harvard University are predominantly thought of as nonprofits, whereas Human Rights Watch or
BRAC42 would receive the moniker NGO. Additionally, organizations
such as Amnesty International, CARE USA, Oxfam, and Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (hereinafter “MSF”) have made
NGO a household word. But the many small, community-based or local
organizations operating in the developing world are also referred to and
conceived as NGOs. Entities with multinational operations are sometimes referred to as “international nongovernmental organizations”
(“INGOs”).
39. Thomas Kelley, Wait! That’s Not What We Meant By Civil Society!: Questioning
the NGO Orthodoxy in West Africa, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 993, 999 (2011).
40. Id. at 997.
41. NGOs represent one type of “civil society organization;” other types may include
informal social groups, sports clubs, labor unions, cultural associations, faith-based organizations, and professional associations. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, ASSESSING
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF ROMANIA 64–65 (1996) [hereinafter CAROTHERS,
ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE].
42. “BRAC” is a well-respected development NGO that was originally founded as the
Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee then renamed the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee and is now simply called BRAC. See A. Mushtaque R. Chowdhury & Abbas Bhuiya, The Wider Impacts of BRAC Poverty Alleviation Programme in
Bangladesh, 16 J. INT’L DEV. 369, 371 (2004).
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Globalization enables locally based, grass roots organizations to extend
their reach into national and international domains. One academic thus
recently defined NGO to include “[any] non-profit, voluntary citizens’
group which is organized at a local, national, or international level, and is
locally, nationally, or internationally active.”43 Another suggested that
the term encompasses all “formal . . . independent societal organizations
whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or international level.”44 Interestingly, however, NGOs do not have any uniformly recognized international legal personality; they are governed only
by relevant national regulation where they are located.
B. Origins and Growth
The roots and foundational practices of NGOs can be traced back centuries. For example, multiple societies (as they were then called) were
established in the United States, England, and France to advocate for the
abolition of slavery and the international slave trade in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.45 Organizations such as the Society for the Relief of
Free Negroes Unlawfully Held in Bondage (founded in the United States
in 1775),46 the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of
Slavery (founded in 1787), the Society for Effecting the Abolition of
Slave Trade (founded in England in 1787), and the Societé des Amis des
Noirs (founded in France in 1788)47 exchanged information, coordinated
efforts (sending freed slaves on speaking tours), and employed shared
tactics.48 Collectively, this group of organizations might aptly be considered the world’s “first transnational advocacy network.” Beginning in
1815, a range and number of peace societies (another early incarnation of
globalized NGOs) emerged in the United States and Europe, and grew to

43. Anton Vedder, Questioning the Legitimacy of Non-Governmental Organizations,
in NGO INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 1, 2 (Anton Vedder
ed., 2007).
44. Martens, supra note 34, at 282.
45. See MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 224 (2004); Steve Charnovitz,
Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 183, 191–92 (1997) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation].
46. See George E. Edwards, Assessing the Effectiveness of Human Rights NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) From the Birth of the United Nations to the 21st
Century: Ten Attributes of Highly Successful Human Rights NGOs, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L
L. 165, 170 n.10 (2010).
47. See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 420; Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation, supra note 45, at 192.
48. See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 428.
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more than 400 in number by the turn of the century.49 These “peace societies had a significant influence on international organization and law,”50
most notably, in connection with the development of international arbitration and mediation.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, NGOs continued to make a
mark on world affairs, but during the 1930s and 1940s, NGO influence
seemed to wane. In describing NGO influence during the first half of the
twentieth century, political scientists Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst
note that:
In the twentieth century, peace groups . . . developed the ideas that
shaped the League of Nations and later the United Nations . . . . The
League of Nations also invited NGOs to participate in meetings [and
conferences] . . . . Many NGOs established offices in Geneva to facilitate contacts with the league . . . . Between 1930 and 1945, NGOs’ influence diminished, in large part because governments were preoccupied with rising security threats and economic crisis and the league’s
role declined.51

Several of today’s most prominent Northern NGOs were founded in
the twentieth century. In the aftermath of World War I and the Russian
Revolution, Save the Children was founded in the United Kingdom in
1919.52 It addressed the needs of orphaned children in Austria and Eastern Europe after the war, and it quickly became an advocate for the rights
of children worldwide.53 Although Oxfam International, an organization
focused on global poverty relief, was technically formed in 1995
(through a combination of independent groups), its origins date back to
Britain in 1942 and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, founded to
relieve famine in Nazi-occupied Greece.54 Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch, two renowned human rights-focused NGOs, were
born in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively.55 MSF, the international medical humanitarian organization, was formally established in France in
1971, then joined by sister organizations in Belgium, Switzerland, and
the Netherlands in the early 1980s, later expanding throughout Europe,

49. See Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation, supra note 45, at 192–93.
50. Id. at 193.
51. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 225.
52. See LINDENBERG & BRYANT, supra note 25, at 13.
53. See id.; History, SAVE THE CHILDREN, http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/aboutus/history#begining (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
54. See LINDENBERG & BRYANT, supra note 25, at 13–15.
55. See Naz K. Modirzadeh, Taking Islamic Law Seriously: INGOs and the Battle for
Muslim Hearts and Minds, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 197 n.16 (2006).
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North America, Australia, and Hong Kong.56 Originally, MSF started as
a response to the Nigerian-Biafra War and the unwillingness of other
humanitarian services to intervene without government approval; today it
continues to provide emergency medical assistance to human populations
in danger.57
Over the past two decades, the number of NGOs operating globally has
grown dramatically.58 From established Northern NGOs based in the developed countries of Europe, North America, and parts of Asia to Southern NGOs operating in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, both the numerical growth and the increase in institutional
influence of NGOs are profound. For example, “in the United States
alone the number of internationally active NGOs formally registered
with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and their revenues grew much faster than both U.S. total giving to charities and the
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).”59 Similar trends also are reflected
at the local level with many developing countries witnessing significant
increases in the number of NGOs operating on the ground.60

56. See About Us—Timeline, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES/DOCTORS WITHOUT
BORDERS, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/aboutus/timeline.cfm (last visited Feb.
3, 2012).
57. See LINDENBERG & BRYANT, supra note 25, at 14.
58. See, e.g., id. at 3.
59. Id. at 3.
60. See, e.g., Jillian S. Ashley & Pengyu He, Opening One Eye and Closing the Other: The Legal and Regulatory Environment For “Grassroots” NGOs in China Today, 26
B.U. INT’L L.J. 29, 38–42 (2008) (discussing growth in China); Blitt, Who Will Watch the
Watchdogs?, supra note 30, at 294 (discussing growth in India, Brazil, Nepal, and Tunisia); Janice H. Lam, Note, The Rise of the NGO in Bangladesh: Lessons on Improving
Access to Justice for Women and Religious Minorities, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 101,
104 (2006) (discussing growth in Bangladesh).
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FIGURE 1. Total Number of U.N. Recognized NGOs by Year, 19462009
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consultative status with the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2009, available at
http://esango.un.org/paperless/content/E2009INF4.pdf

Although estimates of the total number of NGOs active around the
world vary widely, the number of NGOs recognized by the United Nations rose sharply over the past six decades. FIGURE 1 displays the increase in total number of NGOs recognized by the United Nations with
consultative status at the Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”).61
From 1946 through the early 1970s, fewer than two hundred organizations had consultative status compared to more than 2,700 organizations
with such status today. The first major growth phase occurred from 1970
to 1993. FIGURE 2 shows the number of newly recognized NGOs granted
consultative status in four-year periods from 1946 to 2009. The number
of new entrants saw a modest but consistent uptick from the early 1970s
through the mid-1990s.62
FIGURE 1 shows a second inflection point beginning in the 1990s when
the total number of U.N.-recognized NGOs began a second dramatic rise.

61. Consultative status permits organizations to “propose agenda items, send observers to all meetings, and submit brief written statements.” Ahmed, supra note 2, at 824. It
also offers certain security clearances providing access to buildings and spaces used by
diplomats. Id. In addition, NGO engagement with the UN has included involvement with
the General Assembly, the Security Council, the UN Secretariat, and other agencies. See
Chadwick F. Alger, Expanding Involvement of NGOs in Emerging Global Governance,
in SUBCONTRACTING PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF NGO PEACEBUILDING, supra note 13, at
3, 6–8; Ahmed, supra note 2, at 826.
62. Cf. LIDENBERG & BRYANT, supra note 25, at 3 (“The international nonprofit sector’s growth took off in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s.”).
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In 1994, about five hundred NGOs had participatory rights at ECOSOC;
by 1998, nearly one thousand organizations enjoyed consultative status.
Hence the total number of U.N.-recognized organizations increased by
more than 100% in just four years. In other words, in the span of four
years, the U.N. recognized as many organizations as it had during its entire fifty year history. By 2009, the number mushroomed to about 2,750.
FIGURE 2 displays a sharp jump in the number of newly recognized
NGOs from 1994 to 1997 that reached new levels sustained for each
four-year period thereafter.
FIGURE 2. Number of New NGOs Granted Consultative Status by U.N.
by Year, 1946-2009
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A series of major global conferences and summits held through the
early 1990s played a significant role in driving the expansion of U.N.NGO relationships.63 The Earth Summit (formally known as United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) in Rio de Janeiro
(1992) was followed by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993), the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (1994), the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen (1995), and the Beijing Conference on Women (1995).64 As
63. See Kim D. Reimann, A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the
Worldwide Growth of NGOs, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 45, 58 (2006).
64. See Major Conferences and Summits, DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF.,
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/about/conferences.shtml (last visited Feb. 3,
2012); Peter Willets, From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 191, 195 tbl.1
(2000).
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U.N. conferences increasingly became open to a larger number of NGOs,
their meaningful participation created incentives for more NGO participation (and specific interest in some form of U.N. recognition),65 especially among national and local organizations that were previously excluded.66
Looking beyond the growth in number of NGOs with U.N. consultative status, the proliferation of nonprofit organizations is widespread and
well-documented in many countries. In his book on civil society, Don
Eberly summarizes the global nature of this phenomenon:
[Nonprofit scholars Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier] have found
that civil society has become a major force in many countries over the
past decade, its presence “far more widespread than typically thought.”
In one recent year, 60,000 nonprofits were created. In Germany, the
number of associations tripled over ten years. Sweden, known for its
extensive welfare state, showed some of the highest participation rates
in civil society . . . . One of the largest surveys of the nonprofit sector
ever conducted, covering twenty-two countries, found over one million
such organizations operating in India, 210,000 in Brazil, 17,500 in
Egypt, and 15,000 in Thailand. One in twelve jobs in the countries surveyed were supplied by nonprofits.67

Accurate estimates of NGOs on a global scale are notoriously difficult
to tally. But, the NGO origins run deep and their numbers are growing.
Today, there are few places in the world where NGOs do not operate.
C. Explaining the NGO Explosion
A variety of different forces contributed to the increase in the number
of NGOs operating around the world over the past decades. First, a series
of significant cultural and political policy shifts occurred during this period altering the background conditions affecting the NGO landscape.
Second, a series of specific societal developments also stand out: the
65. Organizations may qualify for general consultative status, special consultative
status, or roster status. Each category has a slightly different set of criteria and accompanying rights. The great majority of NGOs recognized by the U.N. have special consultative status. See U.N. Secretary-General, List of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2010: Note by
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/2010/INF/4 (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Note of the
U.N.
Secretary-General],
available
at
http://esango.un.org/paperless/reports/E2010INF4.pdf.
66. See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 227; Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the
International Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 19, 26 (1997); Willets, supra note 64,
at 193–96.
67. DON EBERLY, THE RISE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: BUILDING COMMUNITIES AND
NATIONS FROM THE BOTTOM UP 18 (2008).
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growth of private philanthropy and wealth, globalization, and the explosion of communications technologies.
The first of these relevant policy shifts came during the 1980s as democracy promotion became a priority of the Reagan administration.68 An
increased emphasis on foreign aid as a means to promote democracy
abroad included support for NGOs as part of its core strategy. A new
wave of democracy aid programs was created as part of the response to
the heightened anticommunism sentiment of the time.69 For example,
U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) officials recast
human rights assistance projects from the 1970s as democracy projects to
continue and expand their efforts.70 Although initially concentrated on
Latin America and Asia,71 democracy aid expanded through the early and
mid-1990s into the former Soviet Union and neighboring Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.72 A key element of the
democracy aid initiative included the delivery of money and training to
support locally-based NGOs abroad. In describing the core strategy of
the period, Thomas Carothers describes a democracy template:
The template’s third category is civil society. The template ideal is a
diverse, active, and independent civil society that articulates the interests of citizens and holds government accountable to citizens. U.S. democracy promoters often highlight nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) involved in public interest advocacy, such as human rights or
women’s issues, as a vital form of civil society.73

As a result, the promotion of the NGO sector became part of the standard aid and technical assistance package of democracy solutions offered
to transitional countries.74 Aid programs explicitly targeting NGO support “have grown more and more common, and are now part of U.S. democracy aid portfolios in most countries. The United States is scarcely
alone in this regard. Many other donor countries, as well as private aid
organizations, have embraced the concept.”75 In parts of the world where

68. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE
29 (1999) [hereinafter CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD].
69. See id.
70. See id. at 36.
71. See id. at 29.
72. See id. at 40.
73. Id. at 87.
74. See id. at 90.
75. Id. at 207; see also CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, supra note
41, at 2 (noting financial support from Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden as well as multilateral organizations such as the U.N., the European
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there had been few independent NGOs operating before the 1990s—such
as Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa—aid from the Global North
fueled an NGO boom.76
Another important policy development that converged with the NGO
explosion was the heightened influence of Washington Consensus economic development policies in the early 1980s.77 The Washington Consensus describes a set of ideas and policies pursued by the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development
Bank, think tanks, and other policy makers during this period.78 It is often understood as a “reaction against . . . extensive [government] interventionism” in favor of neo-liberal policies, emphasizing instead greater
reliance on market forces.79 Accordingly, with funding scaled back,
many social services previously carried out by governments were either
eliminated or turned over to the nonprofit sector.80 Thus, new opportunities emerged for the private philanthropic sector to grow and to provide
services left in the void generated by the new development policies.81
After a decade or so, the Washington Consensus began to break down
as international financial institutions themselves began to question the
effectiveness of the approach. “Towards the end of the 1980s, the opposition to such policies had been gathering strength through observing
how they had neglected the consequences for what has become known as
‘adjustment with a human face.’”82 Thus the post-Washington Consensus
emphasized the social goals of development. Interestingly, this new focus also contributed to the growth of the nonprofit sector, this time beUnion, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of
American States, and the Organization of African Unity).
76. See CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD, supra note 68, at 215.
77. See John Weeks & Howard Stein, Washington Consensus, in THE ELGAR
COMPANION TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 676, 676 (David Alexander Clark ed., 2006)
(“The Consensus reigned hegemonic in international development policy from the early
1980s to the mid-1990s.”); Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, The Death of the Washington
Consensus?, 16 WORLD POL’Y J. 79, 80 (“The power of the Washington Consensus over
development theory and practice in the 1980s and 1990s is hard to overstate.”).
78. See BEN FINE, SOCIAL CAPITAL VERSUS SOCIAL THEORY 132 (2001).
79. See id. at 134.
80. See LESTER M. SALAMON & ALAN J. ABRAMSON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
PROJECT, THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 3 (1982); Thomas Kelley,
Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit
Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2461 (2005).
81. See KATHARINE NEILSON RANKIN, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF MARKETS:
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEPAL 22 (2004) (noting that civil
society organizations sought to “fill the vacuum left by the restructuring of the welfare
state mandated by economic liberalization processes in countries around the world”).
82. FINE, supra note 78, at 135.
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cause the funding institutions and donor agencies realized that NGOs
could be powerful development partners. As a result, as commentators
today observe:
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become key mediators of
political, economic, and social change in the post-Washington Consensus era. While development experts have lauded NGOs as efficient
conduits for aid, and pointed to the NGO “boom” as an indicator of
democratizing civil societies, anthropologists have focused on the myriad ways NGOs help to remake forms of social organization and government.83

In addition to the aforementioned social and political factors, several
other forces also may have contributed to the accelerated growth of
NGOs and their networks. During the past two decades, the world has
experienced dramatic increases in private philanthropy due to extensive
expansion of private wealth, unprecedented globalization, and a spread
of communications technologies that have spurred the growth of global
NGOs.

83. Analiese M. Richard, Mediating Dilemmas: Local NGOs and Rural Development
in Neoliberal Mexico, 32 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 166, 166 (2009).
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FIGURE 3. Percentage of Major U.S. Foundation Grants Allocated
to International Giving84
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Notably, private wealth and private philanthropy have both greatly expanded and become more globalized.85 Accordingly, as wealthy donors
devoted new and more resources to the nonprofit sector, support for international NGOs and organizations in the developing world increased
correspondingly. For example, FIGURE 3 shows the growth in international giving by the largest foundations in the United States.86 According
84. These data are drawn from the following sources: STEVEN LAWRENCE & REINA
MUKAI, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 26
(2010) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010]; STEVEN LAWRENCE ET AL.,
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 26 (2009)
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & REINA MUKAI,
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 20 (2008)
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2008]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA ET AL., FOUND. CTR.,
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 20 (2007); JOSEFINA
ATIENZA & ASHLEY BAILEY, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON
FUNDING PRIORITIES 25 (2006); JOSEFINA ATIENZA & JENNIE ALTMAN, FOUND. CTR.,
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 19 (2005); JOSEFINA
ATIENZA & LESLIE MARINO, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON
FUNDING PRIORITIES 19 (2004).
85. See EBERLY, supra note 67, at 16 (noting increases in families with assets over
$30 million, the growth rate of billionaires, and the geographic distribution of the superwealthy); Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 753, 763 (2011) [hereinafter Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?].
86. The Foundation Center’s annual study is based on a sample of large foundations.
For example, the 2008 sampling base included more than 800 of the 1000 largest foundations and the fifteen largest foundations in nearly every state, ranked by total grant giving
and a sampling of other foundations. Consequently, the sample is not a stratified random
sample of the nation’s full set of private foundations. In addition, the composition of the
set varies from year to year. See FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 84, at 39–
40.
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to the Foundation Center’s annual study of foundation giving trends, approximately 14% of grant dollars were allocated to international giving
in 2002. That figure rose to almost 25% in 2008. As global civil society
scholar Don Eberly explains, “Fueling the growth in the nonprofit sector
is a burgeoning private philanthropy, arising from unprecedented new
wealth in America and from tax code incentives to channel portions of
that wealth toward the social good. The number of private foundations
has tripled since the early 1990s.”87
Globalization and improved communications technologies also have
helped propel NGO growth. Many commentators have discussed how the
rapidly evolving global marketplace has changed commerce and culture.
Philanthropy is similarly affected. Heightened awareness of global human needs and a growing sense of interconnectivity among peoples
across national borders have led to increased interaction, information,
and access to funding for international NGOs and locally-based NGOs
operating overseas.88 Improvements in communications technologies
“helped transform the world of NGOs.”89 The widespread diffusion of
knowledge and information through facsimile machines, telecommunications, and the Internet over the past two decades permitted smaller organizations to flourish, facilitated collaborations, and provided means for
organizations to communicate their messages without intermediaries or
government restrictions.90 This “advent of cheap and instant communications” enabled NGOs to become effective focal points for mobilizating
people.91
II. THE ANTI-NGO MOVEMENT
For many, the paradigmatic nonprofit organization is a tireless advocate addressing important social issues such as human rights, economic
development and poverty reduction, environmental justice, housing inequality, health disparities, women’s rights, and racial discrimination,
among others. In the United States, nonprofits are frequently considered
positive forces that promote the public good, prompt and monitor gov-

87. Id.
88. See KARNS & MINGST, supra note 45, at 226 (discussing globalization has a contributing factor to NGO growth).
89. McGann & Johnstone, supra note 15, at 164.
90. See id. at 164–65.
91. Hildy Teegen & Jonathan P. Doh, Conclusion: Globalization and the Future of
NGO Influence, in GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS, supra note 29, at 203, 214.
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ernment, and provide important connections between local, national, or
international citizens.92
It is interesting that anti-NGO criticism is not limited to just one traditional ideological camp. To the degree that the left/right political continuum (in the way those terms are used in the United States) is a useful
construct to categorize criticisms, the most vocal and organized antiNGO forces are associated with the right. Elements on the left, however,
have also expressed serious concerns about NGOs.
Given the rapid growth and the enthusiastic promotion of NGOs, it
should not be surprising that critics have emerged attempting to de-halo
the nonprofit sector. Although the anti-NGO view is not widely shared,
careful analysis of opinion data may not be entirely comforting to nonprofit advocates. The introduction of this Article noted some good news
for nonprofits drawn from public opinion survey data: nonprofit organizations are among society’s most trusted institutions.93 Unfortunately,
there is some worrisome data from public opinion surveys as well.
In the United States, the aforementioned critical views also may reflect
a broader disquiet among the general public about confidence in the entire charitable sector. A survey of Americans, released in April 2008 by
the Brookings Institution and the Organizational Performance Initiative
at New York University’s Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public
Service, found that public confidence in nonprofits was at contemporary
lows.94 Thirty-four percent expressed “not too much” confidence or
“none at all.”95 These figures are within the percentage of the margin of
error of the record lows of 2002 (37%) covering the seven years in which
data on that measure has been collected.96 Moreover, the survey found
that since 2003, the majority of Americans rated the nonprofit sector
“somewhat good” or worse with regard to performance in “helping people.”97 As nonprofit scholar Paul Light, the author of the Brookings
study, highlights in his report, “somewhat good” is not an encouraging
rating. He writes, “[f]ew Americans believe that ‘somewhat good’ is a
92. See FRUMKIN, supra note 10, at 2 (“In the United States, nonprofit and voluntary
organizations are seen as playing a central role in generating, organizing, and emboldening political opposition, working through national networks and building international
linkages.”).
93. See EDELMAN, supra note 16, at 11 and accompanying text.
94. See PAUL C. LIGHT, BROOKINGS INST., HOW AMERICANS VIEW CHARITIES: A
REPORT
ON
CHARITABLE
CONFIDENCE
3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/04_nonprofits_light/04_nonprofi
ts_light.pdf.
95. See id. at 3.
96. See id. at 1 (noting a margin of error of +/- 3%).
97. See id. at 4.
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positive rating in other areas of their lives—e.g., somewhat good surgery,
somewhat good food, or somewhat good airplanes.”98 In fact, the number
of respondents indicating the sector has done a “very good” job steadily
declined from more than one third of the sample population in 2003 to a
quarter in 2008.99
To be fair, general survey results should not be mistaken for widespread acceptance of anti-NGO viewpoints. But the data suggest that the
reservoir of goodwill assumed to exist for nonprofit organizations is vulnerable. Accordingly, NGO critics may be able to tap into an existing
undercurrent of skepticism that will further fuel an anti-nonprofit sentiment. In addition, the results demonstrate that the more vocal critics are
not extreme outliers and suggest that critiques are unlikely to fade in the
near future.
Of course there is no homogeneous set of NGO institutions. NGOs are
characterized by their diversity and bring a wide range of perspectives
and voices into the public discourse.100 Yet many critics of NGOs do not
see the benefits of such diversity and pluralism. Instead they see threats.
Of the vocal critics, the right seems to be focused on the largest and
best-established nonprofits with political views often deemed “liberal.”101
Generally, the right is concerned that these progressive NGOs are given
too much credence and taken too seriously by governments, media, corporations, and others. In contrast, the left is skeptical of the organizational power of nonprofits. They view the growth and reliance on nonprofits
as a means of advancing the privatization of political affairs and as a system controlled and manipulated by the wealthy to advance moderate solutions at the expense of radical social change. Under this view, the dominant network of international foundations and NGOs operating at the
98. Id. at 4.
99. See id. at 4.
100. See JEM BENDELL, DEBATING NGO ACCOUNTABILITY 33 (U.N. Gov’t Liaison
Serv. 2006) (listing NGO benefits to include “participation and deliberation [and] pluralizing power beyond governments”); RIPINSKY & VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 35, at 11
(“NGOs provide information, arguments and perspectives that governments do not bring
forward.”); see also Brody & Tyler, supra note 9, at 591 (“[D]iversity of the charitable
sector is viewed as desirable . . . . Nonprofits can and do form on all sides of a contentious issue”); Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful Possibilities of Nonprofit Mergers: Supporting Strategic Consolidation Through Law and Public Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
1089, 1097–98 (2001) (discussing pluralism); David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable
Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 559–60 (2006) (suggesting that nonprofit activity creates involvement by more individuals and generates pluralism of ideas).
101. See, e.g., Jeremy Rabkin, Paper Delivered at an American Enterprise Institute
Conference: Why the Left Dominates NGO Advocacy Networks (June 11, 2003), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2003/06/11/20040402_20030611_Rabkin.pdf.
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highest levels has been disparagingly referred to as the “non-profit industrial complex.”102 Finally, many government leaders have expressed hostility toward NGOs and a fear of undue international interference. Government bodies, particularly states that are targeted by NGO human
rights and environmental policy campaigns, have denounced NGOs and
pursued new legal restrictions aimed at curtailing their activities, discrediting their motives, or silencing their voices.
A. Critics from the Right
For the anti-neoliberal globalization movement that protested domestic
and multinational corporations, the dramatic rallies held outside the
World Trade Organization in November 1999 in Seattle103 represent the
key moment in that particular counter-mobilization effort. For the right’s
nascent protest against NGOs, if there was a single galvanizing moment
it may have been a staid academic conference held in Washington, D.C.,
during the summer of 2003. This conference was organized by the American Enterprise Institute (“AEI”), a powerful Washington think tank with
ties to the right, and the Institute of Public Affairs, a similarly conservative Australian think tank.104 The program criticized NGOs as unaccountable and undermining government sovereignty.105 Out of that conference, AEI introduced a collaborative initiative with the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies called “NGO Watch.”106
NGO Watch is a political campaign and website designed to monitor
and critique international nonprofit organizations.107 The primary focus
of the NGO Watch project appears to be the activities of large, estab102. Dylan Rodríguez, The Political Logic of the Non-Profit Industrial Complex, in
THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
21, 21 (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2007).
103. See John Burgess & Steven Pearlstein, Protests Delay WTO Opening, WASH.
POST, Dec. 1, 1999, at A1; Sam Howe Verhovek & Steven Greenhouse, National Guard
Is Called to Quell Trade-Talk Protests—Seattle Is Under Curfew After Disruptions, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at A1.
104. See JAMES G. MCGANN & ERIK C. JOHNSON, COMPARATIVE THINK TANKS,
POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 171 (2005) (noting that Institute of Public Affairs is one of
Australia’s oldest and leading think tanks).
105. See Danielle Pletka, Roger Bate & Jon Entine, We’re Not from the Government,
but We’re Here to Help You, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RES. (June 11, 2003),
http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/international-organizations/werenot-from-the-government-but-were-here-to-help-you-event/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
106. See Anwar Iqbal, Analysis: Are NGOs Accountable?, UNITED PRESS INT’L (June
11,
2003,
8:13
PM),
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/SecurityIndustry/2003/06/11/Analysis-Are-NGOs-accountable/UPI-54551055376812/.
GOVERNANCE
WATCH,
107. See
NGO
Watch,
GLOBAL
http://www.globalgovernancewatch.org/ngo_watch/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
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lished, “liberal” institutions focused on international matters, such as
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the World Wildlife Fund.108 Originally
launched as its own program in 2003, NGO Watch has since rebranded
and expanded into a broader Global Governance Watch initiative, covering the United Nations, NGOs, and other entities with influence over international law and policy.109
In explaining the rationale for the project, NGO Watch highlights accountability concerns. Its original mission statement contemptuously
asks, “What is their [NGOs] agenda? . . . . And to whom are they accountable?”110 Additionally, in explaining the roots of NGO Watch,
AEI’s Danielle Pletka, Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy
studies, stated that the need arose from the conviction that influential
“NGOs are not accountable . . . . not transparent. NGOs are not elected.”111
The project’s founding mission statement presents the “growth,”
“power,” and “influence” of NGOs as a cause of concern.112 The statement alleges that “[m]any [NGO] groups have strayed beyond their original mandates and assumed quasi-governmental roles. Increasingly, nongovernmental organizations are not just accredited observers at international organizations, they are full-fledged decision-makers.”113 This
statement suggests that the sponsors of NGO Watch regard more limited,
modest NGO goals and activities as acceptable and proper (i.e., their

108. See, e.g., Esther Kaplan, Follow The Money: Bush Has Revived the Christian
Right Through Direct Federal Largesse, NATION, Nov. 1, 2004, at 20 (identifying such
organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Human Rights Watch, the
Audubon Society, and Planned Parenthood as targets of NGO Watch); Philip Mendes,
Editorial, The Hidden Agenda of the NGO Wars, CANBERRA TIMES (Australia) Mar. 4,
2005, at A11 (discussing NGO Watch, AEI, and IPA and their attacks on international
NGOs, including Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and the World Wildlife Fund).
109. See Keeping an Eye on National Sovereignty, AEI NEWSL. (Am. Enter. Inst. for
Pub. Policy Research, Wash. D.C.), June 1, 2008 [hereinafter Keeping an Eye], available
at http:// www.aei.org/article/28080.
110. NGO Watch Mission Statement, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH,
http://www.aei.org/files/2003/06/11/20030612_NGOWATCHannouncement.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with author).
111. Keeping an Eye, supra note 109 (quoting Danielle Pletka of AEI).
112. See NGO Watch Mission Statement, supra note 110 (“Recent years have seen an
unprecedented growth in the power and influence of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). While it is true that many NGOs remain true to grassroots authenticity conjured
up in images of protest and sacrifice, it is also true that non-governmental organizations
are now serious business.”).
113. Id.
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“original mandates”), but sponsors see an inappropriate shift by certain
nonprofits in their sense of organizational mission and scope of activity.
AEI, the primary funder of NGO Watch, has deep ties to the business
community. Initially formed as a small business group in 1938 called the
American Enterprise Association, the organization moved to Washington
in 1943.114 Over the years, AEI has become an influential conservative
think tank, promoting free-market capitalism, deregulation, and other
neoconservative ideas.115 With assets in excess of $135 million, AEI has
substantial resources to deploy,116 numerous conservative backers,117 and
close ties to the Republican establishment.118 Today its board of trustees
consists primarily of businessmen119 from the corporate and financial
sectors, including senior executives from prominent multinational corporations (e.g., International Paper Company, MeadWestvaco Corporation)
and investment firms (e.g., The Carlyle Group, Greenhill & Co., Inc.).120

114. See History of AEI, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., http://www.aei.org/about/history/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2012).
115. See Christopher Demuth, American Enterprise Institute, in THINK TANKS AND
POLICY ADVICE IN THE UNITED STATES 78 (2007) (description of AEI written by Christopher Demuth, President of AEI); Dana Milbank, White House Hopes Gas Up a Think
Tank—For Center-Right AEI, Bush Means Business, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2000, at A39;
see also Marin Cogan, Blowing Sunshine, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 2009, at 5 (noting
that the annual AEI black-tie gala is commonly referred to as the “neocon prom”).
116. See Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form 990), AM. ENTER.
INST.
FOR
PUB.
POLICY
RES.
1
(Feb.
10,
2011),
http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/530/530218495/530218495_201006_9
90.pdf.
117. See JAMES G. MCGANN, THINK TANKS AND POLICY ADVICE IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 115, at 63, 113 (noting a history of substantial support for AEI from
the conservative John M. Olin Foundation); see also John Cavanagh, Institute for Policy
Studies, in THINK TANKS AND POLICY ADVICE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 115, at
113 (noting the Olin Foundation “spent roughly $20 million a year for the generation of
big ideas through the American Enterprise Institute”).
118. See Edward P. Djerejian, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, in THINK
TANKS AND POLICY ADVICE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 115, at 80 (“Scholars at
the AEI helped make the Reagan revolution.”); Robert Pear, Medicare Chief To Leave
Agency, Paper Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at A10 (describing AEI as “a research
organization with Republican ties”); see also History of AEI, supra note 114 (discussing
AEI’s historic connections to Robert Bork, Gerald Ford, Irving Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Laurence Silberman, Antonin Scalia, and John Snow, among others).
119. The term “businessmen” is purposefully used in this context because twenty-six
of the twenty-seven members of the Board of Trustees are male. AM. ENTERPRISE INST.,
2010 ANNUAL REPORT (2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/1969/12/31/2010Annual-Report.pdf.
120. See id.
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Several observers consider the NGO Watch campaign an orchestrated
effort to silence and marginalize NGOs. For example, Canadian journalist Naomi Klein writes that:
[t]he war on NGOs is being fought on two clear fronts. One buys the silence and complicity of mainstream humanitarian and religious groups
by offering lucrative reconstruction contracts. The other marginalizes
and criminalizes more independent-minded NGOs by claiming that
their work is a threat to democracy. The U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) is in charge of handing out the carrots, while
the American Enterprise Institute, the most powerful think tank in
Washington, D.C., is wielding the sticks.”121

In addition to NGO Watch, other organizations adopted similar approaches or launched coordinated campaigns. For instance, Australia’s
Institute of Public Affairs has published several critiques of NGOs.122
The Capital Research Center (“CRC”), a right-leaning Washington,
D.C.-based research institute,123 has also launched a nonprofit watch
campaign. CRC’s GreenWatch targets nonprofits working on environmental issues, homing in on EarthJustice (formerly known as the Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund), the Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra Club,
among others.124
The most substantive criticisms from the right contend that NGOs undermine national sovereignty, question NGO representativeness with
respect to the constituencies they aim to help, and claim NGOs are opposed to free markets and capitalism. As political scientist Kim Reimann
explains, “[a]ccording to these [politically conservative and right-of121. Naomi Klein, Op.-Ed., Bush to NGOs: Watch Your Mouths, GLOBE & MAIL
(Can.), June 20, 2003, at A15.
122. See, e.g., Gary Johns, NGO’s: Lazy Activism, AUST. FIN. REV. (Dec. 6, 1999),
http://www.ipa.org.au/news/615/ngo’s-lazy-activism (suggesting that the “democratic
mechanism is being eroded by the status afforded NGO’s . . . . [t]heir claim to a moral
superiority is baseless”); Don D’Cruz, NGO’s: Chasing the Corporate Dollar, IPA REV.
28
(Sept.
2003),
available
at
http://www.ipa.org.au/library/Review553%20NGOS%20chasing.pdf (alleging that corporate donors use nonprofit donations to protect their reputations from attack by NGOs).
123. CRC was “established in 1984 to study non-profit organizations, with a special
focus on reviving the American traditions of charity, philanthropy, and voluntarism.”
RES.
CTR.,
About
the
Capital
Research
Center,
CAPITAL
http://www.capitalresearch.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
CAPITAL
RES.
CTR.,
124. See
GreenWatch
Org.,
Gang
Green,
http://www.capitalresearch.org/gw/ gang_green/index.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (on
file with author) (a listing of what CRC considers “the worst environmental groups”).
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center] critics, NGOs and their rising influence in national and international politics threaten democracy, capitalism and sovereignty of the nation-state.”125 This viewpoint is common across many conservative critics of NGOs.
Many conservatives believe that NGOs undermine democratic practices and national sovereignty.126 In this view, NGOs exert pressure and
exercise influence outside of established institutional political systems,
thereby permitting special interest groups to thwart the will of the people
acting through their legitimate governmental leaders.127 Ultimately, this
is seen as part of a threat to the nation-state system, promoting a system
of “global governance” in conjunction with the United Nations and international law.128 These same critics are generally hostile to the United
Nations and international treaties that limit sovereignty. Connections between the U.N. and NGOs, international standards, and other constraints
of global governance are viewed as a “conspiracy to promote liberal internationalism”129 at the expense of the will of the people as a whole
(represented by sovereign governments).130 Generally, such charges challenge the perceived legitimacy of NGOs to participate in domestic and
international politics.
A secondary critique questions the legitimacy of NGO representativeness to adequately express positions on public issues or advocate on behalf of others. This line of assault focuses on the voice of the NGOs,
most often when those organizations advocate on behalf of a constituency or geographic area, typically one that may be poor, subordinated, or
otherwise considered less powerful. Specifically, in these instances,
NGOs are often derided as self-appointed guardians that advocate on
125. Kim D. Reimann, Up to No Good? Recent Critics and Critiques of NGOs, in
SUBCONTRACTING PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF NGO PEACEBUILDING, supra note 13, at
37, 48.
126. See Jon Frandsen, The Right Takes Aim at NGOs, 68 CQ WEEKLY, no. 22, May
30, 2005, at 1417.
127. See id. (quoting an official with the CRC); see Gary Johns, Paper Delivered at an
American Enterprise Institute Conference: The NGO Challenge: Whose Democracy Is It
Anyway?
3
(June
11,
2003,
Wash.
D.C.),
available
at
http://www.aei.org/files/2003/06/11/20040402_20030611_Johns.pdf.
128. See Marguerite A. Peeters, Paper Delivered at an American Enterprise Institute
Conference: The Principle of Participatory Democracy in the New Europe: A Critical
Analysis
(June
11,
2003,
Wash.
D.C.),
available
at
http://www.aei.org/files/2003/06/11/20040402_20030611_Peeters.pdf; Rabkin, supra
note 101, at 3.
129. See Reimann, supra note 125, at 48.
130. See Gary Johns, Protocols With NGOs: The Need To Know, 13 IPA
BACKGROUNDER, Nov. 2001, at 1, 1, available at http://www.ipa.org.au/library/.svn/textbase/IPABackgrounder13-1.pdf.svn-base.
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behalf of special interests and are unrepresentative of the general public
or those they claim to represent.131 This concern is heightened when distant charitable organizations or funders, usually in the Global North, are
seen to be influencing or speaking for peoples or problems in the Global
South.
Finally, right-wing critics claim that NGOs are opposed to corporations and undermine capitalism and free markets.132 In this view the promotion of corporate social responsibility efforts by international NGOs is
detrimental and insidious. In particular, these critics believe that NGO
advocacy campaigns aimed at corporations “cause[] reputational damage
to corporations . . . [and] hamper[] capitalism by creating unrealistic expectations for what corporations are responsible for and by misinforming
the public of the various misdeeds committed by corporations.”133
Clearly, critics on the right are uncomfortable with NGOs and civil society serving as a potent counterweight to the power of government and
the private sector. The real fear of the right is that government-like power will expand the influence of NGOs. Cloaked in the neutral language of
accountability, the attacks on NGOs reveal hostility to private collective
action that is not animated by profit. The right posits a democraticallyelected government that is accountable to voters and a free-market economic system that is accountable to shareholders as the only legitimate
sources of power in a society. Accordingly, NGO Watch and similar efforts represent a subtle assault on civil society, a campaign orchestrated
to limit the effectiveness of “liberal” organizations and cabin the strength
of organized independent voices represented through nonprofit corporate
forms.
B. Critics from the Left
Those on the political left also voice skepticism about the role of
NGOs and their increased influence in the modern world. Interestingly, a

131. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229,
245–46 (2003) (stating “NGOs are essentially transnational factions”).
132. See Jon Entine, Paper Delivered at an American Enterprise Institute Conference:
Capitalism’s Trojan Horse: Social Investment and Anti-Free Market NGOs 2 (June 11,
2003,
Wash.
D.C.),
available
at
http://www.aei.org/files/2003/06/11/200404022_20030611_entine.pdf; Jarol B. Manheim, Paper Delivered at an American Enterprise Institute Conference: Biz-War: Foundation-NGO Network Warfare on Corporations in the United States (June 11, 2003, Wash.
D.C.),
available
at
http://www.aei.org/files/2003/06/11/20040402_20030611_Manheim.pdf.
133. Reimann, supra note 125, at 48.

488

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 37:2

large part of the left-wing criticisms of NGOs have been grounded in
attacks of accountability, similar to the right-wing critique. The ideological criticisms from the left can be divided into four general themes: questions about who benefits; questions about the value of local expertise;
neocolonialism; and the deleterious impact of NGOs on individual citizens, governments, and the relationships between the two.
Where right-wing critics worry that NGOs diminish corporate power,
left-wing critics argue the opposite, asserting that NGOs serve as agents
furthering Western capitalist interests. Moreover, liberal critics suggest
that the tax-exempt status of NGO donations wrongfully shifts decisionmaking regarding resource allocation and distribution away from public
processes and places such determinations in the hands of private corporations and individuals. Finally, the international NGOs have been criticized for usurping decision-making authority from the domestic governments of the countries that receive aid.
The first accountability concern of the left is the question of who benefits. Specifically, the concern is that NGOs are not adequately accountable to the citizens NGOs claim to serve. The left’s view of accountability
differs somewhat from the right’s concerns, which focus on sham representativeness and organizational structures in NGOs.134 Instead, the left
is primarily afraid that NGOs reflect a false representativeness that privileges self-serving interests or specialized expertise at the expense of genuine grassroots interests and voices in the countries in which they operate.135 Some critics believe there is a “worrying disconnection” between
the policies international NGOs propound and the best interests of the
people that the groups proclaim to serve.136 Thus, critics charge that
NGOs push their own agendas, ignore indigenous individuals’ input
when formulating goals and, as a result, often advocate for policies that
are not in a country’s best interests.137 A Brazilian activist has similarly
134. See supra Part II.A.
135. See RIPINSKY & VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 35, at 12 (“NGOs . . . regularly
take positions that developing countries consider to be inimical to their (short- and medium-term) interests.”).
136. See Hetty Kovach, Addressing Accountability at the Global Level: The Challenges Facing International NGOs, in NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, &
INNOVATIONS, supra note 17, at 195, 199–200 (“The absence of effective accountability
mechanisms at the global level has produced a worrying disconnection between global
organizations and the individuals they impact.”).
137. See Reimann, supra note 125, at 47 (“The proliferation of NGOs in developing
countries in response to international funding opportunities, for example, has led to numerous, sometimes competing, small local projects that fragment poor communities into
sectoral groupings and undermine their ability to see the larger, more systemic causes of
their poverty and underdevelopment.”).
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argued—on the subject of professional women in NGOs—that they
“want[] to control the agenda . . . and [want] to confine the struggle to
exclusively feminist issues . . . . These . . . NGO professionals are authoritarian and with a colonialist mentality; they have nobody behind them
except their wealthy outside backers.”138
Another increasingly common criticism of NGOs raised by the left is
that NGOs protect the interests of corporate and government donors.
Specifically, some critics, recognizing that NGOs increasingly depend on
donations from wealthy entities and governments to fund their activities,
have observed that NGO policies are more responsive to donors than to
those the organizations seek to serve.139 Of course, this is somewhat ironic because being responsive to financial backers is often viewed as a
form of accountability.140 But there are many alternative forms of accountability and groups to which a nonprofit organization may be accountable.
Other critics worry that when the interests of financial backers take a
front seat, accountability to the marginalized people served by NGOs
may suffer, creating an accountability paradox. A stronger version of this
critique argues that corporate donations are motivated by the desire to
enhance a corporation’s public image, achieve policy development that
benefits the corporation, or both.141
These twin motivations—corporate donors’ motivation to seek benefit
and NGOs motivation to obtain funding—create a system in which
NGOs are really advancing, or are perceived to advance, policies that
benefit the interests of wealthy corporate donors.142 In doing so, funding
pressures may compromise NGO autonomy and limit their ability to pur-

138. Adjoa Florência Jones de Almeida, Radical Social Change: Searching for a New
Foundation, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 102, at 185, 191 (citation omitted).
139. See id. at 187.
140. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the
Market For Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 599 (2009) (noting that “[t]here is widespread criticism of the accountability of nonprofits to donors”).
141. See BENDELL, supra note 100, at 67 (“If we look more closely at the way donors
provide finances, it becomes apparent that some funding is more of an exchange, through
which donors actually purchase services or an enhanced profile . . . to try and attain policy changes from the recipient.”).
142. See Christine E. Ahn, Democratizing American Philanthropy, in THE
REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX,
supra note 102, at 63, 68–70; see also id. at 71–72 (describing a project funded by the
Rockefeller Foundation to fight hunger in Mexico as an attempt to protect corporate interests in Mexico against a potential communist revolt).
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sue radical social change.143 As mentioned earlier, one activist argues
that corporations grow wealthy by exploiting workers while they simultaneously receive benefits from making “charitable” donations, calling
the system the “non-profit industrial complex.”144
Additionally, left-wing critics claim that the growing number of wellestablished international NGOs with staffed professionals only exacerbates this problem. Donors tend to favor high-profile NGOs that are
driven by the views and interests of policy experts in their respective
fields.145 These subject-matter experts, however, often have no connection to the communities for which these experts advocate, do not attempt
to build grassroots support for their policies, and fail to establish meaningful relationships with the citizenry on the ground.146 As a result,
Western expertise may be privileged and may ultimately frustrate the
voice of indigenous communities in the political development of their
regions.
These concerns about NGO accountability are echoed by scholars and
activists in developing nations. The neocolonialism criticisms contend
that NGOs are advancing “a new era of Western economic and political
imperialism.”147 Tamsin Bradley, in his analysis of NGO activity in
South Asia, writes “The NGO operates as a government institution and
exercises its might by marginalizing the developing world . . . . Individuals within target communities are therefore treated as passive subjects
and are denied the agency to shape their own futures.”148 Bradley contends that NGOs may advocate only those policies that fit within dominant Western ideology.149 He argues that the promotion of limited Western viewpoints restricts the communities served by NGOs to what the
Western world traditionally considers to be “development,” thereby im-

143. de Almeida, supra note 138, at 186.
144. Andrea Smith, Introduction: The Revolution Will Not Be Funded to THE
REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX,
supra note 102, at 1, 8–9; see also de Almeida, supra note 138, at 186 (noting that “there
is a very fine line between ‘milking the system’ and being milked by the system.”).
145. Smith, supra note 144, at 10.
146. See id. at 10 (“these purported experts are generally not part of the communities
they advocate for and hence do not contribute to building grassroots leadership”); see
also TAMSIN BRADLEY, CHALLENGING THE NGOS 4 (2006) (“[t]hose targeted to receive
aid are not involved in the decision-making . . . instead Western constructions of
knowledge determine who is qualified to know and act . . . . [This] creates the development ‘expert’ (typically white, middle/upper-class and educated).”).
147. Reimann, supra note 123, at 47 (describing neocolonialism critiques of NGOs).
148. BRADLEY, supra note 146, at 6–7.
149. See id. at 3.
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posing another form of colonialism through charity.150 Additionally,
scholars analyzing the impact of NGOs in the Arab world suggest that
Arab nations often view NGOs as “elitist and corrupt organizations with
no accountability . . . [that] promot[e] western agendas.”151 These are
merely a few illustrations of a sizable concern that NGOs subvert the true
interests of the communities they claim to serve in favor of their own
agendas.152
Critics on the left also voice concerns about the negative impact of
NGOs on state power and on the relationship between the citizen and the
state. First, some regard the shift toward reliance on NGO-based aid
models with suspicion because NGOs may be used as tools for advancing neoliberalism, a conservative ideology that promotes a hegemonic
anti-state, private-oriented, capitalist system.153 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri explain that:
Some critics assert that NGOs, since they are outside and often in conflict with state power, are compatible with and serve the neoliberal project of global capital. While global capital attacks the powers of the nation-state from above, they argue, the NGOs function as a ‘parallel
strategy from below’ and present the ‘community face’ of neoliberalism.154

Second, other critics have complained that NGOs ease what otherwise
might be considered government burdens, thereby removing public pres-

150. Id. at 3 (“The West requires proof that the developing country is competent in the
task of changing itself in line with the Western model of modernization.”).
151. Nicola Pratt, Hegemony and Counter-hegemony in Egypt: Advocacy NGOs, Civil
Society, and the State, in NGOS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 31,
at 123, 124.
152. See generally Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at
799, 807–08 (discussing pressures of modern philanthropy that limits community-based,
bottom-up problem solving); Julia Paley, The Paradox of Participation: Civil Society and
Democracy in Chile, 24 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. no. 1, 2001, at 1 (documenting the rise of civil society—including NGOs—in Chile and suggesting that advocacy by
these private groups often had a deleterious effect on the democratic participation of
community members).
153. See Reimann, supra note 125, at 47 (describing a common left critique that NGOs
are an important component of the neoliberal model); see also David Rieff, The False
Dawn of Civil Society, NATION, Feb. 22, 1999, at 11, 12 (“[T]he idea of civil society begins to look less like a way of fostering democratic rights and responsive governments
and more like part of the dominant ideology of the post-cold war period: liberal market
capitalism.”).
154. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 312–13 (quoting James Petras, Imperialism
and NGOs in Latin America, MONTHLY REV., Dec. 1997, at 10–27) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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sure and support to devote public resources to address social problems.155
In other words, shifting decision-making regarding societal problems to
private decision-makers undermines opportunities for collective problem-solving.
Third, critics also argue that “were it not for charitable deductions allowed by tax laws, [the amount of the tax benefit] would have become
public funds to be allocated through the governmental process under the
controlling power of the electorate as a whole.”156 Thus, the argument
goes, NGO strength systematically weakens and “decapitates” governments.157 Moreover, a concern here is that corporate donors and wealthy
individuals, who direct tax-privileged monies to NGOs of their choice,
are not representative of the general public.158
C. Government Responses
The accountability arguments—from the left and the right—that NGOs
exercise independent power (either as a handmaiden of or a challenge to
corporate interests) are not lost on governments. As a result, governments have proposed and pursued a range of strategies to regulate, manage, limit, and even co-opt NGOs. Although not all NGOs perceive

155. See Christopher Collier, NGOs, the Poor, and Local Government, 6 DEV. IN PRAC.
244, 248 (1996) (“Projects in which NGOs use their own resources to deliver goods and
services—which local government should be delivering but is not—lead the population to
reduce its expectations of what local government can or should be doing for it.”); Issa G.
Shivji, Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What We Are, What We Are Not, and What We
Ought to Be, 14 DEV. PRAC. 689, 691 (2004) (“NGOs let the government off the hook as
it abdicates its own responsibility.”); Brendan Martin, New Leaf or Fig Leaf?: The Challenge of the New Washington Consensus, PUB. WORLD 16 (2000),
http://www.publicworld.org/files/newleaf.pdf (“Societies which depend on [NGO and
development] largess to meet their basic health and education needs are neither sustainable, democratic nor equitable.”). Cf. Sins of the Secular Missionaries, ECONOMIST, Jan.
29, 2000, at 25, 26 (“Larger NGOs have pledged not to act as ‘instruments of government
foreign policy.’ But at times they are seen as just that. Governments are more willing to
pay groups to deliver humanitarian aid to a war zone than to deliver it themselves.”).
156. Ahn, supra note 142, at 65.
157. See ERICA BORNSTEIN, THE SPIRIT OF DEVELOPMENT: PROTESTANT NGOS,
MORALITY, AND ECONOMICS IN ZIMBABWE 16–17 (2003); Joseph Hanlon, An ‘Ambitious
and Extensive Political Agenda’: The Role of NGOs and the AID Industry, in GLOBAL
INSTITUTIONS AND LOCAL EMPOWERMENT 132, 138 (Kendall Stiles ed., 2000).
158. See Ahn, supra note 142, at 64–66 (documenting the difference in demographic
composition between corporate board of directors and the public as a whole). It is interesting to note that this argument implicitly assumes government decision-making is preferable to that of wealthy interests for distributing aid. Because critics of the left have
heavily criticized governments for donating to NGOs based on political motivations,
however, this assumption may be questionable.
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themselves to be engaged with politics, their activities are always an expression of values.159 As a result, national governments have long been
“cautious about the possibility of NGOs becoming a separate political
force and influencing existing partisan politics.”160 In addition, as discussed in Part I above, in both the developed and developing world,
NGOs can pressure local governments, insert themselves into businessgovernment relationships,161 and exert influence over significant portions
of some countries gross domestic product through “relief donations and
trade sanctions.”162
Accordingly, around the world some governments and their most senior officials are openly hostile to or critical of NGOs. For instance, John
Bolton, who would go on to serve as United States Ambassador to the
United Nations during the George W. Bush administration, compared
NGO involvement in international affairs to fascism. He argued:
[I]t is precisely the detachment from governments that makes international civil society so troubling, at least for democracies . . . . Indeed,
the civil society idea actually suggests a “corporativist” approach to international decision-making that is dramatically troubling for democratic theory . . . . Mussolini would smile on the Forum of Civil Society.
Americanists do not.163

More than just offering criticisms, a range of governments, including
some in democratic societies, have adopted or proposed anti-NGO laws
that create complex and burdensome registration requirements, impose

159. See David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption—Beyond
Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 24
(2006); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of The Federal Income Tax Exemption For Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 430 (1998);
Evelyn A. Lewis, Charitable Waste: Consideration of a “Waste Not, Want Not” Tax, 30
VA. TAX REV. 39, 68 (2010).
160. Jude L. Fernando & Alan W. Heston, The Role of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment: NGOs Between States, Markets, and Civil Society, 554 ANNALS 8, 13 (1997). Cf.
Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 790–801 (discussing international philanthropy—
including that from the United States—as a supportive element of public diplomacy and a
source of soft power).
161. See generally Jonathan P. Doh, Nongovernmental Organizations, Corporate
Strategy, and Public Policy: NGOs as Agents of Change, in GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS,
supra note 29, at 1, 4–12 (discussing the multiple roles NGOs play in businessgovernment interface).
162. See Jone L. Pearce, Foreword to GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS, supra note 29, at xi,
xiii (“NGOs . . . can influence the direction of 10 or even 30 percent of the country’s
gross domestic product.”).
163. John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L.
205, 217–18 (2000).
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intrusive and invasive oversight, or restrict associational rights, freedom
of speech, or access to financial support. In fact, “[i]n the ten years since
the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights Defenders was adopted, at least
twenty countries have adopted laws imposing legal and regulatory restraints on NGOs.”164 In one extreme case, the government of Ethiopia—
in an effort to reduce foreign influence—passed a law in 2009 banning
NGOs with more than 10% of international funding from engaging “in
any activities relating to democracy, justice, or human rights.”165 In Australia, the “neo-liberal and neoconservative politics of the [John] Howard
government (while in power from 1996–2007) recast the idealism of
NGO charters as socially unfashionable and naïve, while the Howard
government’s policies sought to undermine their effectiveness.”166
Scholars have accused the Howard government of attempting to “silence
dissent” through denigration, bullying, public criticism, and defunding of
NGOs.167
Government efforts to impede NGOs through legal, regulatory, and extralegal channels demonstrate the precarious political climate and the
power of anti-NGO sentiment in some countries. Governments have used
a variety of strategies to attack NGOs, including expulsion, control of
activities, attempts to overwhelm through bureaucracy, and co-optation.
This is not an exhaustive list of strategies, but rather a set of examples.
Drawn from a wide range of countries around the world, the following
cases provide examples of government efforts hostile to nonprofit entities.
1. Expulsion of NGOs
For many years, Sudan—Africa’s largest country—has been beset by
conflict. Sudan has been ravaged by two waves of civil war. The first
brutal round took 1.5 million lives, the second (and familiar Darfur conflict) resulted in the deaths of over 200,000 and 2 million fled their

164. Jennifer M. Gleason & Elizabeth Mitchell, Will the Confluence between Human
Rights and the Environment Continue to Flow? Threats to the Rights of Environmental
Defenders to Collaborate and Speak Out, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 267, 274 (2009).
165. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, at 63
(2010), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Chapter3_reprint.pdf.
166. James Arvanitakis, Surviving Neo-Liberalism: NGOs under the Howard Years, 6
no.
3,
2009,
at
53,
54,
available
at
NEBULA,
http://www.nobleworld.biz/images/4Arvanitakis.pdf.
167. Id. at 59–64; see also Sarah Maddison & Clive Hamilton, Non-government Organisations, in SILENCING DISSENT: HOW THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONTROLLING
PUBLIC OPINION AND STIFLING DEBATE 78–100 (Clive Hamilton & Sarah Maddison eds.,
2007).
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homes.168 Sudan, notorious for its human rights abuses,169 has drawn intense international criticism, particularly from humanitarian NGOs.170 It
168. See
Sudan
Profile,
BBC
NEWS
(Nov.
29,
2011),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/820864.stm#media; see also Perry S.
Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 823, 828 (“Sudan’s
postcolonial history is marked by bloodshed.”); Sudan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/sudan/index.html
?scp=1-spot&sq=sudan&st=cse (then follow “Read More . . . ” hyperlink) (estimating
that Africa’s longest-running civil war, between north and south Sudan, killed approximately 2.2 million people, and describing the Darfur conflict as “one of the world’s worst
humanitarian crises”).
169. See Darfur Tops U.S. List of Worst Human Rights Abuses, USA TODAY (Mar. 6,
2007),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-03-06-humanrights_N.htm?csp=34&loc=interstitialskip.
170. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, A Darfur Envoy, N.Y. TIMES ON THE GROUND (Apr.
16,
2006,
7:34
PM),
http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/a-darfurenvoy/?scp=20&sq=darfur%20campaign&st=cse. According to the United States Department of State’s 2009 Human Rights Report on Sudan, many human rights abuses
occurred in Sudan:
The following human rights abuses occurred in Sudan: abridgement of citizens’
right to change their government; extrajudicial and other unlawful killings by
government forces and other government-aligned groups throughout the country; torture, beatings, rape, and other cruel, inhumane treatment or punishment
by security forces; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention, incommunicado detention of suspected government opponents, and prolonged
pretrial detention; executive interference with the judiciary and denial of due
process; obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the expulsion of humanitarian NGOs; restrictions on privacy; restrictions on freedom of
speech; restrictions on the press, including direct censorship; restrictions on
freedoms of assembly, association, religion, and movement; harassment of
IDPs; harassment and closure of human rights organizations; violence and discrimination against women, including female genital mutilation (FGM); child
abuse, including sexual violence and recruitment of child soldiers, particularly
in Darfur; preventing international human rights observers from traveling
to/within Sudan; trafficking in persons; discrimination and violence against
ethnic minorities; denial of workers’ rights; and forced and child labor.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: SUDAN (Mar. 11, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135978.htm [hereinafter 2009 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT: SUDAN]; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Signs Bill Allowing Sudan
Divestment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2008, at A7 (describing Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act and its “aim[] at pressur[ing] Sudan to end violence in Darfur region”). See
generally Joyce Apsel, On Our Watch: The Genocide Convention and the Deadly, Ongoing Case of Darfur and Sudan, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 53 (2008); Jamie A. Mathew, The
Darfur Debate: Whether the ICC Should Determine that the Atrocities in Darfur Constitute Genocide, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 517 (2006); William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes
against Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1703 (2006); Mary Deutsch Schneider, About Women, War and Dar-
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is estimated that more than seventy-five international NGOs work within
the Darfur region of Sudan alone.171
Not surprisingly, with much of the blame for the conflict in the region
placed on the government, the government has been critical of and hostile to NGO assistance.172 For example, in March 2009, after the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir as a result of atrocities committed in
Darfur,173 Sudanese officials expelled several international humanitarian
NGOs from the country.174 To justify the expulsions, the government

fur: The Continuing Quest for Gender Violence Justice, 83 N.D. L. REV. 915, 958–87
(2007).
171. Sudan Vows to Expel Foreign NGOs from Darfur, GOOGLE NEWS (Mar. 16,
2009),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iqdYZGXFI3sxbQoAZo8FGuoe
wQyg (noting, as of March 2009, there were eighty-three NGOs in Darfur before thirteen
were expelled). However, “[a]rmed conflict, poor transport infrastructure, and lack of
government support have chronically obstructed the provision of humanitarian assistance
to affected populations.” The World Factbook: Sudan, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (last updated
Sept. 27, 2011).
172. See Public Statement, Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: Continuing Blockade of Humanitarian
Aid
(Apr.
4,
2006),
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/010/2006/en/273ef57a-fa09-11dd-b1b0c961f7df9c35/afr540102006en.pdf (providing examples of actions by the Sudanese government to obstruct humanitarian aid in the country, including refusing to renew NGOs’
mandates and suspending and expelling NGOs).
173. See Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at A6 [hereinafter Simons & MacFarquhar,
Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader]; ICC Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Apr.
20,
2009),
President,
HUMAN
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/20/icc-issues-arrest-warrant-sudan-s-president.
[T]he ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir as an indirect perpetrator or as an indirect co-perpetrator of five counts of crimes against humanity—
murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, rape—and two counts of war
crimes—intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or
against individual civilians not taking part in hostilities and pillaging in Darfur
between March 2003 and July 2008.
2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: SUDAN, supra note 170. See generally John E. Tanagho &
John P. Hermina, The International Community Responds to Darfur: ICC Prosecution
Renews Hope for International Justice, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 367 (2009) (discussing the arrest warrant for President Bashir and the international response).
174. Sudan Vows to Expel Foreign NGOs from Darfur, supra note 171; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed, A President, a Boy and Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at
A31.
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used general criticisms of NGO credibility and accountability, and accused the aid groups of having ulterior motives and serving as agents for
the ICC.175 Almost immediately after the warrant was announced, the
Sudanese government summoned several NGOs to a meeting at which
they were ordered to leave the country or curb their work.176 The government then expelled thirteen international NGOs and revoked the licenses of three NGOs to operate, and ordered them to hand over their
assets (including computers, vehicles, and other equipment).177 The affected NGOs denied the charges, stressing their independence from formal government entities and lack of ties with the ICC in particular.178

One of Mr. Bashir’s first actions after the [ICC] arrest warrant was to undertake
yet another crime against humanity: He expelled major international aid groups
. . . . in effect, he is now preparing to massacre the Darfuri people in still another way, for Darfuris are living in camps and depend on aid workers for food,
water and health care.
Id.
175. See Neil MacFarquhar & Marlise Simons, Bashir Defies War Crime Arrest OrTIMES
(Mar.
5,
2009),
der,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/world/africa/06sudan.html [hereinafter MacFarquhar & Simons, Bashir Defies War Crime Arrest Order]; Louis Charbonneau, Sudan
Expulsions of NGOs Leave Aid Gap—UN, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN09481219. Confirming the expulsion of the NGOs,
Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha stated, “Whenever an organization takes humanitarian aid as a cover to achieve a political agenda that affects the security of the
[country] and its stability, measures are to be taken by law to protect the country and its
interests.” Sudan Expels 10 Aid NGOs and Dissolves 2 Local Groups, SUDAN TRIB. (Mar.
4, 2009), http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-expels-10-aid-NGOs-and,30382 [hereinafter Sudan Expels NGOs].
176. See Simons & MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader,
supra note 173.
177. See Health Fears as Sudan Expels NGOs, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/03/200935174114968814.html [hereinafter
Health Fears]; Sudan Vows to Expel Foreign NGOs from Darfur, supra note 171.
Among the international NGOs expelled were: Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders (Dutch
and French branches), CARE, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, the Norweigan Refugee
Council, the International Rescue Committee, Action Contre la Faim, Solidarites, CHF
International, the Khartoum Centre for Human Rights, Development and Environment,
and Amal Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence. See MacFarquhar & Simons,
Bashir Defies War Crime Arrest Order, supra note 175 (explaining that the affected aid
agencies represent about 40% of the 6,500 international and local aid workers in Darfur);
Sudan Vows to Expel Foreign NGOs from Darfur, supra note 171; Sudan Expels Aid
(Mar.
4,
2009),
Groups
in
Response
to
Warrant,
MSNBC.COM
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29492637/ns/world_news-africa/t/sudan-expels-aidgroups-response-warrant/#.TpILVHLLKCM.
178. See, e.g., Sudan Expels NGOs, supra note 175; Health Fears, supra note 177.
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The expulsions were plainly retaliatory, as one aid official stated, “[i]t
happened right after the announcement . . . . [t]he connection was
clear.”179
Although the Sudanese government’s expulsion of the NGOs was
strongly condemned,180 the decision was not reconsidered. The Sudanese
government promised to cover the work of the expelled NGOs,181 but the
void left by the absence of extensive charitable aid operations remained.182 According to reports, the NGO “expulsions reduced the access of 1.5 million persons to healthcare; 1.16 million to water, sanitation, and hygiene; and 1.1 million to food aid.”183 The United Nations
warned, “[i]t is not possible, in any reasonable timeframe, to replace the
capacity and expertise these [NGOs] have provided over an extended
period of time.”184

179. Simons & MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader, supra
note 173 (quoting a charity official).
180. Urging the government to urgently reconsider its decision to shut down aid
groups, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stated that the decision would
cause “irrevocable damage” to humanitarian efforts in Sudan if not reversed. Health
Fears, supra note 177. Similarly, the United States and other countries urged Sudan to
reconsider its expulsion decision. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Obama Urges Sudan to Allow
Aid Groups Back Into the Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at A12; Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Official Says Darfur Continues to Crumble, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at
A8 [hereinafter MacFarquhar, U.N. Official Says Darfur Continues to Crumble] (all fifteen members of the United Nations Security Council expressed concern about the fate of
affected Darfur civilians, and “[e]ven friends and neighbors of Sudan, like China, Uganda
and Libya, which support a deferral of the court’s indictment, expressed concern about
the impact of the expulsions.”).
181. Government spokesman Kamal Ibaid claimed that “[w]hat had been provided by
those organisations to people in Darfur could simply be provided by national organisations.” Sudan: NGO Expulsion to Hit Darfur’s Displaced, IRIN NEWS (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=83370 [hereinafter Sudan: NGO Expulsion] (referring to expelled NGOs).
182. See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Official Calls Darfur Aid Tenuous, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2009, at A12 (explaining how stopgap measures by United Nations agencies
kept aid flowing to Darfur but described them as “Band-Aid solutions, not long-term
solutions”); MacFarquhar, U.N. Official Says Darfur Continues to Crumble, supra note
180 (describing continuing deterioration of humanitarian situation in Darfur in wake of
Sudanese “government’s decision to expel major foreign aid organizations from the
country”).
183. 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: SUDAN, supra note 170. Mercy Corps President
Nancy Lindborg stated that the Sudanese government’s decision was “a devastating blow
to the many people of Sudan who rely upon NGOs for both immediate survival, and help
in building more prosperous and stable futures for their families.” Sudan Expels NGOs,
supra note 175.
184. Sudan: NGO Expulsion, supra note 181.
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The above demonstrates that NGOs—especially the active international humanitarian organizations—and critiques against them are used as a
political tool. Although Sudan’s actions were clearly retaliatory in nature, the expulsion of international NGOs represents an extreme form of
government attack on the sector grounded, at least ostensibly, in NGO
accountability and legitimacy concerns.
2. Control of NGO Activities
The Egyptian government, prior to the Arab Spring, was widely considered an opponent of human rights and liberal democracy in the Middle
East. In its annual report rating countries from one (“most free”) to seven
(“least free”), Freedom House International gave Egypt a political rights
score of six, a civil liberties score of five, and an overall rating of “not
free” for 2010.185 Although Egypt boasts one of the largest NGO communities in the Southern global community186—including the rest of the
Arab world—Egyptian civil society has faced increasingly strict government regulation.187 Egypt adopted anti-NGO laws limiting the freedom and ability of NGOs to operate in the country.
The “Egyptian government [first] . . . entertain[ed] the idea of a law
[regulating] NGOs” in 1999, when it purported to invite civil society or-

185. Freedom in the World 2010—Egypt,
FREEDOM HOUSE (May 2010),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c0ceaf5c.html. The Freedom in the World survey
provides an annual evaluation of the state of global freedom as experienced by individuals. The ratings process is based on a checklist of ten political rights questions and fifteen
civil liberties questions. A rating of one represents “most free,” while a rating of seven
means “least free.” Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to
determine an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Those whose ratings
average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered “Free,” 3.0 to 5.0 “Partly Free,” and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not
Free.” More information regarding the survey’s methodology can be accessed at MethodHOUSE,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-worldology,
FREEDOM
2012/methodology (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
186. In 1997, Egypt had 14,000–15,000 private non-profit organizations, in addition to
many more youth clubs, professional syndicates, and trade unions. See Robert J. LaTowsky, Egypt’s NGO Sector: A Briefing Paper 1, 6 (Educ. for Dev. Occasional Papers
Ser. 1, No. 4, 1997), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED412412.pdf. However,
approximately 25% of the NGOs then registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs were
inactive. Id. at 10; see also James G. McGann, Pushback Against NGOs in Egypt, INT’L J.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Aug. 2008, at 29, 32–34.
187. See McGann, supra note 186, at 31 (“[A]lthough Egyptian society shows many
cultural indicators of philanthropy and is demonstrably committed to the founding of
NGOs, official registration, long-term development, and the growth of NGOs is significantly limited under current political conditions.”).
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ganizations to discuss a draft of a new law, Law No. 153 (“Law 153”).188
However, the government solely crafted the draft of the law, which was
sent to Parliament for approval “without [any] direct consultation [with]
civil society [organizations].”189 Once approved, the law received widespread criticism190 and was ultimately repealed on procedural grounds in
2000 by the Supreme Constitutional Court.191 “Though repealed, this law
laid the groundwork for [its sucessor] Law 84/2002” (“Law 84”).192
Similar in content to Law 153, Law 84 was quietly issued and quickly
passed by both houses of Parliament in 2002, again with no consultation
from civil society organizations.193 Generally broad in scope, the law
provides the Egyptian government with substantial control over NGO
operations.194 The law grants the government an extraordinary amount of
“power and discretion to grant or deny registration to an NGO, [to] interfere in the operations and fundraising of an [NGO], and to order [an involuntary] dissolution.”195
Law 84 imposes strict registration requirements, creating substantial
obstacles for NGOs from their inception.196 The state regulatory authority
has the ability to reject NGO applications under Article 11 of the law,
which vaguely outlines prohibited NGO activities.197 Most notably, Article 11 permits rejecting an application based on governmental determina188. Id. at 35; see Mohamed Agati, Undermining Standards of Good Governance:
Egypt’s NGO Laws and Its Impact on the Transparency and Accountability of CSOs,
INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Apr. 2007, at 56, 60.
189. McGann, supra note 186, at 35; see Agati, supra note 188, at 60.
190. See Defending Civil Society, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Apr. 2008, at 30, 65
(describing how the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
expressed “deep concern” with Law No. 153 of 1999).
191. See Agati, supra note 188, at 60; McGann, supra note 186, at 35.
192. McGann, supra note 186, at 35.
193. See Agati, supra note 188, at 61 (“Law No. 84 did not emerge from a dialogue
between the government and society. Rather, it is seen as a tool for the governing elite to
control CSOs [civil society organizations].”) (emphasis added); see also McGann, supra
note 186, at 35 (noting that Law 84 was “quietly passed”).
194. See McGann, supra note 186, at 35; see also Agati, supra note 188, at 62–63
(discussing the legal analysis of Law No. 84).
195. Agati, supra note 188, at 63; see also McGann, supra note 186, at 35 (“Law 84
allows the government to undermine efforts of the political opposition by regulating out
of existence NGOs that question state authority, through regulations during the registration stage, the ability to deny the legal foundations of an NGO, and the power to refuse
access to procured funding.”).
196. See Gleason & Mitchell, supra note 164, at 276 (explaining that “only seven of
thirty organizations successfully navigated [through] the country’s NGO registration
requirements” in 2005).
197. See Egypt: Margins of Repression, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 3, 2005),
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11675/section/7 [hereinafter Egypt: Margins of Repression].

2012]

THE ANTI-NGO MOVEMENT

501

tion that the organization “threaten[s] national unity or [violates] public
order or morals.”198 Rejections can also be based on disapproval of an
organization’s founding members or on any provisions of an association’s articles of incorporation determined to violate the law.199 The law
is regularly used as a tool to ban organizations whose behavior or goals
are not favored by the state.200
Even if successful in overcoming the challenges of registration, NGOs
face obtrusive oversight of their activities, “with the threat of dissolution
always looming in the background.”201 Law 84 permits the state to send
representatives to an organization’s meetings and to call meetings of the
organization’s general assembly.202 Moreover, NGOs must provide the
government with minutes within thirty days of each meeting.203 The law
grants the state extraordinary power to regulate the composition of individual NGO boards.204
Law 84 also provides the Egyptian government with a means of control over the funding of NGOs. Under Article 17, an NGO may not accept foreign funding without explicit authorization from the state.205 Although the law provides that the state regulatory authority must give its
final decision within sixty days, because NGOs are not permitted to ac198. McGann, supra note 186, at 36 (“At least five human rights NGOs had been denied registration as of June 2005 due to ‘security concerns’ or other Article 11 considerations.”) (citation omitted); see also Justin Shore, Ctr. for Human Rights & Humanitarian
Law, Human Rights Council Periodic Review Prompts Egypt to Promise NGO Reform,
HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Mar. 24, 2010), http://hrbrief.org/2010/03/human-rights-counciluniversal-periodic-review-prompts-egypt-to-promise-ngo-reform/ (noting that Law 84
allows Egyptian government to “dissolve NGOs or imprison workers for any political
activity or threat to ‘national unity.’”).
199. See McGann, supra note 186, at 35; see also Agati, supra note 188, at 63.
200. See Egypt: Margins of Repression, supra note 197; McGann, supra note 186, at
36.
201. McGann, supra note 186, at 36.
202. See Agati, supra note 188, at 64; McGann, supra note 186, at 36.
203. See McGann, supra note 186, at 36.
204. Specifically, Law 84 requires NGOs to submit nominated board members for preapproval by the state regulatory authority sixty days prior to board elections. See Egypt:
Margins of Repression, supra note 197. Board nominees can be removed by the state
regulatory authority for “non-fulfillment of nomination requirements.” McGann, supra
note 186, at 36 (citation omitted); see also Agati, supra note 188, at 64 (“The board of
directors must provide a list of board nominees to the Ministry of Social Affairs within a
day of their nomination.”).
205. See Mohamed ElAgati, Egypt, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., May 2010, at 9, 10;
see also Agati, supra note 188, at 65 (“This provision undermines the sustainability of
many organizations. Foreign funding is the most essential financial source for civil human rights and development associations, especially because financing from Egypt’s
private sector for such organizations does not exist.”).
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cess any of the funds during the waiting period, that period can drive
NGOs into insolvency.206 Additionally, NGOs must provide state officials with detailed accounting reports of expenses and revenues, including the sources of donations.207
Violations of Law 84 can result in criminal penalties, including fines or
imprisonment, or even in dissolution of the NGO.208 However, because
activities prohibited in Article 11 are so vaguely defined, the government
has great discretion in determining whether a violation has occurred.209
As a result, many NGOs become “subject to penalty without being clearly forewarned of their illegal activity.”210
Egypt’s Law 84 illustrates a second strategy that governments have
used to curb nonprofit influence. By involving the government directly in
the efforts of nongovernmental organizations, the government may systematically interfere in an NGO’s associational and advocacy activities
as a method of state control.
Even after the Arab Spring and the removal of President Hosni Mubarak earlier in February 2011, Egyptian security forces have raided, harassed, and otherwise inhibited NGOs.211 Recent media reports describe
coordinated raids by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on ten to
seventeen organizations that closed offices and detained staff.212 The reports indicate that the military officers “provided no warrants or explanations” but state news media indicated the focus was on “illegal foreign
funding.”213 The military rulers have taken inconsistent positions both
pledging to halt such raids214 and vigorously defending the crack-

206. One local NGO official noted: “The sixty days are an issue—of course the government will take longer, and we won’t be able to touch it. Our operational funding is
vital. It is essential we get it in time, and it’s the hardest to find. The electricity [bill] must
be paid.” Egypt: Margins of Repression, supra note 197; see also McGann, supra note
186, at 37 (“Many organizations that had experienced trouble with registration find that
gaining permission to use their foreign-donated funds can be equally trying.”).
207. See Agati, supra note 188, at 65.
208. See id. at 65; McGann, supra note 186, at 37.
209. See Agati, supra note 188, at 65 (“For example, activities are prohibited if they
are deemed to threaten national unity or violate the public order or morals. All political
activities are prohibited as well.”) (emphasis in original).
210. See McGann, supra note 186, at 37.
211. See Rebecca Collard & Dan Murphy, US “Deeply Concerned” After Egypt Raids
NGO Offices, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 29, 2011, at 1.
212. See id.
213. David D. Kirkpatrick & Steven Lee Myers, Egyptian Forces Raid and Shut Civic
Groups, Drawing Sharp U.S. Response, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2011, at A4.
214. See Steven Lee Myers & David D. Kirkpatrick, After International Outcry, Egypt
Vows to End Crackdown on Nonprofits, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A4.
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downs.215 Accordingly, “a tremor of fear” has been sent through the network of civil society organizations.216
3. Bureaucratic Barriers
Russia has an active civil society with more than 220,000 noncommercial organizations and public associations.217 However, the NGOs operate
under conditions of significant government regulation, particularly the
enactment of the January 2006 Russian Federation Law, On Introducing
Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation
(“2006 Russian NGO Law”), under then-President Vladimir Putin’s administration.218 The law aimed “to regulate the activities of nongovernmental and non-commercial organizations operating in the Russian Federation and . . . [introduced] new registration procedures and
stricter monitoring of NGO activities, financial contributions, and budgets.”219 In addition to significantly expanding government control over
NGOs, the law “considerably restrict[ed] the right to association and
right to privacy of NGOs and NGO members.”220
215. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Undercutting Vow of Softer Stance, Egypt Again Defends Office Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2012, at A7.
216. Id.
217. NGO Law Monitor: Russia, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW [ICNL],
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.pdf (last updated Nov. 16, 2011) [hereinafter
NGO Law Monitor: Russia].
218. See Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Introducing Amendments into
Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, SABRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Collection of Legislation] 2006, No. 18-FZ,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44363d654.html.
219. Michael P. Maxwell, Comment, NGOs in Russia: Is the Recent Russian NGO
Legislation the End of Civil Society in Russia?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 236
(2006) (quoting Igor Khrestin, New NGO Law in Russia: The Implementation Matters
More
Than
Substance,
AM.
ENTER.
INST.
(Feb.
28,
2006),
http://www.aei.org/article/23965).
220. Alison Kamhi, The Russian NGO Law: Potential Conflicts with International,
National, and Foreign Legislation, 9 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 34, 34 (2006) (describing review of the draft of the law by the Council of Europe, which declared many of the
law’s provisions as “problematic”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Choking on Bureaucracy 2 (Feb. 2008) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Choking on Bureaucracy],
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62400/section/1:
[I]n order to be compatible with protections under international law for freedom of expression and association, these restrictions must be proportionate,
necessary for a democratic society, and must pursue a legitimate aim. The restrictions must also be sufficiently clear so that those subject to them can reasonably know how to comply . . . . The restrictions in the 2006 law do not meet
these tests.
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However, this law is contested by civil society activists. Many critics
have noted that the law was partly aimed at foreign NGOs operating in
Russia, which are perceived as soft power tools advancing Western interests to promote regime changes in Russia and its neighbors.221 In particular, with elections approaching, government leaders were cognizant
of the perception that international NGOs played a key role in stoking the
2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the similar Orange Revolution in
Ukraine a year later.222
The law imposed onerous and stringent registration and reporting requirements on NGOs—especially with respect to foreign sources of
funding—with severe penalties for noncompliance.223 For example, the
law required organizations to fill out approximately one hundred pages
of documents, listing detailed personal information about each founder
and each member.224 A single mistake or misstep in the paperwork could
serve as “grounds for denial of registration, essentially providing the
government with another excuse to dissolve—or refuse to recognize le(emphasis added). “The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
reported that actions and statements by Russian officials ‘indicate a declining level of
tolerance for unfettered NGO activity, particularly for those NGOs receiving foreign
funding.’” Robert C. Blitt, “Babushka Said Two Things—It Will Either Rain or Snow; It
Either Will or Will Not”: An Analysis of the Provisions and Human Rights Implications
of Russia’s New Law on Non-Governmental Organizations As Told Through Eleven Russian Proverbs, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (quoting U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, Challenge to Civil Society: Russia’s Amended Law on Noncommercial
Organizations
6
(2007),
available
at
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/russia_ngo_report_final_march5.pdf).
221. See Maxwell, supra note 219, at 237 (“[T]he new law [the 2006 Russian NGO
Law] comes in the wake of several recent events that seem to indicate this is just another
example of President Putin attempting to gain effective control over the entire political
system.”); see also Gregory L. White, West Hits a Wall With Putin—Despite Rising
Doubts, Leaders Are Reluctant to Alienate Moscow, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2006, at A11
(noting the law was “publicly criticized by a number of Western officials.”).
222. See Rebecca B. Vernon, Closing the Door on Aid, 11 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.
5, 11 (2009); see also George Melloan, Putin’s KGB Instincts Serve Russia Badly, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 14, 2006, at A23.
223. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Choking on Bureaucracy, supra note 220, at 2. The
law “gives the [government] unlimited discretion to request documents for inspection and
[interpretation] . . . including for compliance with the constitution, laws, and ‘interests’ of
Russia in the broadest terms. In several cases, Human Rights Watch found that Russian
government officials had made burdensome requests for documents, including [requests]
for confidential records and communications with clients.” Id.; see also Gleason &
Mitchell, supra note 164, at 275 (describing how Russia’s NGO law imposes burdensome
registration requirements that “substantially infringe on the right of association.”).
224. See Kamhi, supra note 220, at 35. In addition, “[i]f any of the founders are deceased, the organization must provide death certifications.” Id.
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gally—organizations.”225 For several months, Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, the Danish Refugee Council, two branches of
Doctors Without Borders, and other major international NGOs were
temporarily forced to stop their activities for allegedly failing to comply
with the law and its registration requirements.226
The 2006 Russian NGO Law also restricts the formation of, participation, and membership in an NGO to individuals domiciled in Russia,
thereby prohibiting foreign nationals or stateless persons or entities from
effective organization.227 All foreign NGOs operating in Russia must
inform the government about their projects for the upcoming year and
the approximate amount of money allocated to each project; the government then has the discretion to ban projects (or even parts of projects) on
vague basis.228 Moreover, the law also authorizes state officials to conduct intrusive annual inspections of NGOs.229
The election of President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 fueled hope that
the legal framework regulating civil society in Russia might liberalize.230
225. Id.
As of June 29, 2006, forty foreign NGOs had applied for official registration
under the [2006 Russian NGO Law]—and not a single one was successful . . . .
The fact that all forty were denied registration indicates how complicated the
new requirements are and confirms NGOs’ fears that this law can be used to
harass NGOs, creating unnecessary work for them and excuses for the government to deny organizations registration.
Id.; see also Anastasia Kornya, Non-Governmental Organizations Fail the Test,
VEDOMOSTI (June 29, 2006), reprinted in NAT’L CONF. ON SOVIET JEWRY WKLY. NEWS
BRIEF, June 30, 2006, at 9 (A. Ignatkin trans.), available at
www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/Wkly060630.pdf (noting that “forty foreign non-governmental
organizations have tried to obtain official registration in Russia since the new legislation”
and “[n]ot one of them has been successful”).
226. Kamhi, supra note 220, at 35; see also Politics & Economics: Russia Eases
Stance Toward Foreign NGOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2006, at A6 (noting that foreign
governmental organizations were “forced to suspend operations” in Russia); Charles
Digges, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Others Temporarily Halted by
(Oct.
19,
2006),
Russian
NGO
Law,
BELLONA
http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2006/Rejected_NGOs.
227. Kamhi, supra note 220, at 37.
228. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Choking on Bureaucracy, supra note 220, at 3.
229. See id. at 2.
230. See, e.g., Nikolaus von Twickel, Kremlin Takes Small Step to Ease NGO Law,
MOSCOW TIMES (May 28, 2009), http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2009-99-17.cfm
(“Russia’s stifling NGO law has been labeled a hallmark of former President Vladimir
Putin’s heavy-handed approach to civil liberties. Likewise, President Dmitry Medvedev’s
recent promise to review the law has been praised as a sign of his liberalism.”); Peter
Finn, Putin’s Chosen Successor, Medvedev, Elected in Russia—Power-Sharing is Main
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In the spring of 2009, after meeting with NGO leaders and hearing their
complaints, President Medvedev promised to review Russia’s NGO law,
stating that “improvements to NGO legislation were possible and also
necessary.”231 By June 2009, the Russian Duma amended the 2006 NGO
law, attempting to “liberalise the legal position of NGOs”232 and “bring
the restrictive law . . . into line with Russia’s international human rights
obligations.”233 Drafted by a presidential working group including representatives of the administration, the Justice Ministry, the Russian Duma,
the Federation Council, and civil society organizations,234 the amendments eased the previously stringent registration requirements for
NGOs.235 Under the amendments, incomplete or incorrect registrations
and re-registrations of NGOs no longer result in automatic denials of regFocus After a Crushing Win, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2008, at A11 (describing the ability of
Medvedev to “chart a new course for Russia,” including “increasing personal freedoms . .
. and a less confrontational stance abroad”). The hope for improvement in Russia’s civil
society continues to increase, as 2011 is a pre-election year in Russia. See Mikhail Gorbachev, Op-Ed, President Medvedev, Russia Needs a New Agenda, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
Dec. 13, 2010, at 8 (promoting the argument that President Medvedev has the ability to
shape the new agenda for Russia, which includes consideration of the movement in which
grassroots organizing is becoming deeper and stronger in Russian society—a movement
which civil society groups are at the forefront).
231. Eberhard Schneider, Russian Domestic Policy, EU-RUSSIA CENTRE WEEKLY
COLUMN (EU-Russ. Ctr., Brussels, Belg.) (July 20, 2009), available at http://www.eurussiacentre.org/our-publications/column/russian-domestic-policy.html; see also Russia:
Revise NGO Law to Protect Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 13, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/13/russia-revise-ngo-law-protect-rights (“Medvedev
acknowledged the difficulties faced by NGOs, including restrictions ‘without sufficient
justification,’ and the fact that many government officials view NGOs as a threat.”);
Charles Digges, Medvedev Suggests Amendments to Russia’s NGO Law—Human Rights
(June
18,
2009),
Activists
Suggest
More,
BELLONA
http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2009/medvedev_ngo_amendments (noting that
“Medvedev proposed . . . amendments relaxing laws on NGOs.”); von Twickel, supra
note 230 (noting “Medvedev promised to enact changes . . . .”).
232. Schneider, supra note 231 (paraphrasing Garri Minch, President Medvedev’s
respresentative in the Duma). The Russian Duma adopted amendments to Russian Federal Law No. 7-FZ of January 12, 1996, “On Non-Commercial Organizations,” which came
into force on August 1, 2009. See id.
233. Russia: Revise NGO Law to Protect Rights, supra note 231. “Human Rights
Watch, the Moscow Helsinki Group, AGORA, the Youth Human Rights Movement, and
the Human Rights Resource Center [all] submitted a list of proposed reforms for [Russia’s] NGO law to the Ministry of Justice in April [2009] and to the Presidential Council
for Civil Society Organizations and Human Rights in early May [2009].” Id.
234. See von Twickel, supra note 230.
235. See Clifford J. Levy, Russia: Fewer Hurdles for Nonprofit Organizations, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2009, at A8 (explaining the new legislation as “eas[ing] some of the
regulatory burdens on nonprofit groups.”).
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istration; rather, the registration process “may be suspended for up to
three months until the applicant completes or corrects the application.”236
Furthermore, mandatory government audits of NGOs will occur every
three years as opposed to annually.237 In addition, the provision allowing
the government to refuse to register NGOs when the organization is
deemed to threaten Russia’s “unique character, cultural heritage, or national interests of the Russian federation” was removed.238
Thus, while the amended version of Russia’s NGO law is less draconian than the law was under the Putin administration, the Russian government’s aggressive approach to regulating NGOs demonstrates significant
hostility toward civil society, particularly toward those NGOs perceived
to be closely associated with foreign support, expertise, or influence.
4. Co-optation
Civil society organizations have enjoyed a long tradition in Venezuela.
The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution purports to “seek to promote and protect human rights and citizens’ right to participate as the foundation of
democratic coexistence and social peace.” 239 However, recently the Venezuelan government has imposed restrictive laws and practices aimed at
NGOs.240

236. See NGO Law Monitor: Russia, supra note 217; see also von Twickel, supra note
230.
237. See NGO Law Monitor: Russia, supra note 217.
238. See id.
239. NGO Law Monitor: Venezuela, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW,
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/venezuela.pdf (last updated Dec. 31, 2011).
240. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”) report, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, describes a series of state actions and statements by
high-ranking public officials aimed at undermining the legitimacy of domestic and international human rights NGOs in Venezuela. The report identifies a trend of opening unfounded judicial investigations or criminal proceedings against human rights defenders in
order to intimidate them, particularly when they have been critical of the Venezuelan
government. The report also describes cases where judicial proceedings have been
brought against NGOs and human rights defenders for alleged offenses such as, inter
alia, conspiracy to destroy the republican form of government, criminal association, and
defamation. Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep., Democracy and Human Rights
in Venezuela, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 54 (Dec. 30, 2009), available at
http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf; see also 2009 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT: VENEZUELA, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136130.htm (describing how a variety of
independent domestic and international human rights groups operated with some government restrictions and how many domestic NGOs reported threats, physical attacks,
and harassment).
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In December 2010, Venezuela enacted the Law for Protection of Political Liberty and National Self-determination. The law specifically targets
NGOs dedicated to the “defense of political rights” or other “political
objectives.”241 Moreover, the law precludes such organizations from
holding assets or receiving financial support from foreign sources.242 In
addition, government officials continue to debate that the draft Ley de
Cooperación Internacional (“Law on International Cooperation”)243
threatens the “continued existence and independence of NGOs,” as well
as drastically infringes upon the right of freedom of association.244 The
proposed Law on International Cooperation, which was approved on its
first reading,245 gives the Venezuelan government unprecedented authority to control, organize, and direct all “activities of international cooperation,” including, transfers of resources and skills.246 The legislature has
not yet taken further action needed to enact the Law on International Cooperation despite calls by government officials to do so.247
Most significantly, the law requires all foreign funds to be routed
through a government-administered Fund for International Cooperation
and Assistance, which would place substantial discretion and control in
the government with regard to which NGOs receive funds and resources.248 Effectively, the fund would create a new level of dependency
between NGOs and the Venezuelan government, and the government

241. See NGO Law Monitor: Venezuela, supra note 239.
242. See Int’l Ctr. for Not-for-Profit Law, Wave of Constraint: Recent Developments
in Venezuela, Ecuador, Honduras, Iran, Bahrain, and Cambodia 2 (2010), available at
http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/trends2-2.pdf.
243. See Alexandra Freitas, Commentary Regarding Venezuela’s Proposed Law on
International Cooperation, ACCESS INITIATIVE BLOG (July 22, 2009),
http://www.accessinitiative.org/blog/2009/07/commentary-regarding-venezuela´sproposed-law-international-cooperation.
244. Freitas, supra note 243.
245. See NGO Law Monitor: Venezuela, supra note 239.
246. See Venezuela’s NGOs Fear New Law Will Stifle Civil Society, Curb Freedom of
Expression, DEMOCRACY DIGEST BLOG (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.demdigest.net/
blog/2010/12/venezuelas-ngos-fear-new-law-will-stifle-civil-society-curb-freedom-ofexpression/.
247. See NGO Law Monitor: Venezuela, supra note 239.
248. See generally Marcos Carrillo, Venezuela, 12 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 41
(2010) (discussing the law’s prohibitions against foreign funding and routing funding
through the government); see also Freitas, supra note 243; Christopher Toothaker, NGOs
Warn of Restrictions in Pending Venezuela Law, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (May 7, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8495746 (noting that the new Venezuela
law would direct foreign funds into “a government-controlled fund”).
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would have the power to stifle or starve the activities of NGOs not
aligned with its interests.249
Many experts believe it is very likely that the draft Law on International Cooperation will be approved in the near future.250 This should be particularly worrisome to the nonprofit sector because Venezuela’s proposed international cooperation law has influenced other Latin America
countries, such as Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico, to propose similar laws.251
This type of bill demonstrates that NGOs and particularly foreign funding have become lightning rods.252 By controlling or limiting access to
financial support, governments are attempting to discipline—through the
regulation of NGOs—civil society into falling in line.
III. LESSONS FOR THE PHILANTHROPIC COMMUNITY
This Article raises some fundamental questions about anti-NGO
thought, activism, and policies. Beyond a review of the damning critiques of NGOs leveled by others, this Article considers the varieties of
resistance and where they may lead. Are there lessons to be learned from
249. See NGOs Warn of Restrictions in Pending Venezuela Law, supra note 248.
250. Some activities, however, have proven effective in challenging the Law. Examples include:
[a] group of NGOs . . . develop[ing] a national and international lobbying campaign . . . to raise awareness of the consequences of the [Law] . . .; seminars
[being] staged . . . to inform . . . NGOs and . . . NGO beneficiaries of the consequences of the [Law].
Carrillo, supra note 248, at 50–51. Carrillo also suggests “responsive strategies” should
the law be ultimately passed, such as “[c]hallenging the [Law] as unconstitutional before
the Constitutional Chamber of the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia . . . [and the] InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.” Id. (arguing that the Judiciary in Venezuela is
“clearly biased in favor of the [Venezuelan] Government.”).
251. See INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., RESTRICTIONS ON EXCHANGES OF
KNOWLEDGE, CAPACITY, AND EXPERTISE 10–11 (2009) (also noting that Nicaragua and
Indonesia have also begun to consider international cooperation laws similar to Venezuela’s).
252. The term “international cooperation law” suggests that such a law may require
foreign funding to be channeled via a government fund. See NGO Law Monitor: Venezuela, supra note 239. The Venezuelan government has previously accused the United
States and other countries of illegally funding NGOs, charities, and businesses in Venezuela as part of a “dirty campaign” to remove Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez from
office. Id. Chávez accused the United States of “playing a role in a failed 2002 coup,” an
accusation that the U.S. has consistently denied. See Dan Molinski, In Venezuela, Accusations Against Ronald McDonald House, Among Other U.S. Charities, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 25, 2010, at A12 (describing how the Chávez government filed complaints against
“many Venezuelan NGOs as well as local chapters of international organizations,” such
as the Ronald McDonald House Charities).
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these critiques? Can or should individuals and institutions aligned with or
supportive of NGOs do more to support them and better position them
against such attacks? This Article suggests that serious consideration of
anti-NGO arguments and criticisms should lead to critical reevaluations
of the power dynamics between Northern funders and Southern NGO
grant recipients. In particular, I argue that there may be an inverse relationship between efforts to increase the accountability of Northern nonprofit funders and the legitimacy of Southern NGOs receiving support
from Western nonprofit organizations.
A. Accountability
Accountability is at the center of nonprofit discourse today. The notion
that nonprofits need to improve their levels of accountability is conventional wisdom among students of civil society and philanthropy. As used
by a variety of critics and scholars of NGOs, “accountability” appears to
have several different meanings, some of which are inconsistent. These
inconsistencies or contradictions remain unnoticed, are not regularly discussed, and create conceptual confusion. Notably, skeptics of NGOs on
the right, critics of nonprofits from the left, and governments seeking to
discredit the work of NGOs all use the trope of “accountability” as a
sword to attack nonprofit organizations. The ambiguity surrounding the
meaning of the term raises questions—rather than sheds light—on the
role of NGOs in civil society.
The accountability concerns of anti-NGO activists are frequently presented as institutional, efficient, and apolitical critiques of nonprofit behavior. But accountability has several different meanings and uses. It can
refer to financial accountability (i.e., the ability of an organization to effectively safeguard and manage its financial resources), organizational
accountability (i.e., emphasizing the internal governance of nonprofit
organizations and their use of legitimate and transparent processes), mission accountability (i.e., the ability to effectively carry out activities to
advance the primary purposes or mission of the organization), upward
stakeholder accountability (i.e., responsiveness to key individual, corporate, private foundation, and/or government donors that provide essential
funding to finance ongoing operations), and downward stakeholder accountability (i.e., responsiveness to the beneficiaries or constituents
served by the organization).253 Other important measures of and procedures to achieve accountability also exist.254
253. See generally Evelyn Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, in THE STATE
NONPROFIT AMERICA 471, 475–76 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (explaining that
accountability has four meanings: financial probity, good governance, adherence to donor
OF
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Due to the complexity and multiple uses of accountability, it is not always clear what criticisms of NGOs cloaked in accountability mean.
This assortment of varying conceptions of accountability limits the
term’s utility. In some cases, accountability means so many different
things that the term may not actually mean much of anything at all.
As noted earlier, accountability in the corporate and public sectors is
often conceived of in strict, formal terms.255 In the corporate model, accountability usually focuses on ownership lines and emphasizes direct
relationships between owners/shareholders (the principals) and the directors they elect and officers they appoint (their agents). Similarly, in the
public context, accountability is established through the ballot box when
voters consider discrete issues or elect agents, thereby tethering government to individuals. Although quite limited in their own ways, these particular lines of accountability do share the virtue of being clear. Of
course in practice, we may question whether deeply accountable relationships genuinely exist in the corporate and public sectors.
Regardless, the application of a singular primary principal model of
accountability used in the business and government sectors, however, is
inapplicable in the nonprofit context. Rather than relying on direct formal ties, nonprofit accountability in an abstract sense256 is, to borrow the
phrase of Mary Kay Gugerty and Aseem Prakash, a narrative process.257
Thus this creates what I term “thin” and “thick” conceptions of accountability: the former being clear, formal, and objective but limited in scope,
and the latter being indirect, capacious, and subjective in an effort to be
comprehensive and inclusive.

direction and mission, and effectiveness and public trust); James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector: Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 303, 311–12 (2006) (discussing
financial and mission accountability); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why SarbanesOxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
205, 209–19 (2004) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Enron.org] (discussing financial, purposive, and organizational accountability).
254. For example, voluntary membership in associations (that may carry prestige or
credibility) can set minimum standards that provide a basis for nonprofit accountability.
See generally VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS AND NONPROFITS: AN
ACCOUNTABILITY CLUB FRAMEWORK (Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash eds., 2010)
[hereinafter VOLUNTARY REGULATION].
255. See supra text accompanying note 10.
256. However, some of the more specialized treatments of accountability, e.g., financial accountability, are more amenable to a thin application that can be assigned to a
clearly identified source.
257. Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Regulation of NGOs and Nonprofits: An Introduction to the Club Framework, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS
AND NONPROFITS: AN ACCOUNTABILITY CLUB FRAMEWORK, supra note 254, at 3, 6.
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Critics advocate a thin model when they apply ideas of accountability
familiar in public contexts, such as voting, or private contexts, such as
shareholder meetings, to NGOs. This model presumes clearly identifiable
stakeholders. Managers of a corporation are accountable to shareholders;
politicians to voting public—there is no confusion about the source to
whom one may be accountable. But this model is also formal and limited
in scope. It is formal because shareholders and voters are given only the
binary option to accept or reject what is placed before them. It is limited
in scope because they are asked either to respond to policy matters that
have already been defined and narrowed or more often only to accept or
reject the representative herself.
While sharing in critics’ desire for heightened accountability, I would
argue that a thick model is more appropriate for NGOs. NGOs, rather
than answer to one set of clearly identifiable constituents, should strive to
be far more capacious and inclusive. They should look to multiple audiences—upward to donors of different types and downward to a range of
beneficiaries to judge them on performance. Likewise, rather than offer
stakeholders only formal binary options to respond to limited prefabricated choices, NGOs instead should strive to be substantive and comprehensive—that is, NGO accountability should include genuine efforts to
engage constituent stakeholders in broad-ranging substantive discussion
and dialogue to formulate policy choices themselves.
Indeed, a thick nonprofit accountability model is far more difficult to
implement and much harder to measure than a thin one, but such a model
supports the values and the goals of the nonprofit sector and is something
NGOs should aspire to. External and upward accountability approaches
should be combined with internal and downward accountability to local
communities to achieve long-term impact on social ills.258 Genuine accountability will not be achieved in a thin, top-down model. Real accountability must allow the grass roots to speak up, place marginalized
people at the center of their own story, authorize individuals to pursue
the collective common good (as they see and define it), and create room
for beneficiaries to generate and execute their own transformational vision.259
This distinction in accountability perspectives is not just an academic
one; it also affects policy and substantive choices. I worry that if the
nonprofit sector were to select a principal subject of accountability, akin

258. See ALNOOR EBRAHIM, NGOS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 159 (2003).
259. Cf. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 796–99,
807–08 (discussing the value of participatory bottom-up problem-solving for social
change).
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to the voter or the shareholder, that would likely be donors. Of course,
donors are already important nonprofit principals because most nonprofits must seek to secure the financial resources necessary to conduct their
activities. But a donor primacy accountability model would discount other important constituencies and demographics, most notably charitable
beneficiaries often made up of relatively powerless or subordinated
groups and/or communities that are frequently served by nonprofit organizations. Ironically, the adoption of a thin NGO-funder accountability
model may strengthen the arguments of critics and further expose the
nonprofit sector, especially foreign NGOs, to some of the lines of assault
already being used against them. For instance, critiques focusing on representativeness (right), neocolonialism (left), and foreign influence
(lodged by governments) would only be enhanced.
Moreover, if donors were to be relied on as the primary means to keep
nonprofits accountable, many NGO critics still would be dissatisfied.
Especially to the degree that the largest and most influential donors are
institutional ones—particularly private foundations with endowments—
many of the same questions could be recycled: to whom then are the
foundations accountable? Because the very nature of an endowed private
foundation (which is created to exercise private control and by definition
lacks the broad-based public support of other charitable organizations)260
presents its own accountability challenges,261 reliance on NGO-donor

260. The Internal Revenue Service classifies all section 501(c)(3) organizations as
private foundations or non-private foundations (more commonly referred to as public
charities) in accordance with section 509. Private foundations are generally funded by a
very small number of donors, typically by person, members of a family, or single institution. Because of the greater funder control and lack of public involvement, private foundations are treated less favorably and are subject to more restrictions under the Code. In
contrast, public charities are treated more favorably because of their engagement in certain favored activities or the fact that it must continually draw support from a broad
cross-section of funders, thought, perhaps, to offer greater accountability. See I.R.C. §§
509(a)(1), 170(b)(l)(A)(i)–(vi) (2006); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 3–4 (2004); John F. Coverdale, Legislating in the Dark:
How Congress Regulates Tax-Exempt Organizations in Ignorance, 44 U. RICH. L. REV.
809, 812–13 (2010) (discussing control as an element of attraction to the private foundation form for funders); Susan N. Gary, The Problems With Donor Intent: Interpretation,
Enforcement, and Doing The Right Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 1013 (2010) (similar).
261. See Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 771 (noting
private foundation accountability challenges); Sarah E. Waldeck, The Coming Showdown
Over University Endowments: Enlisting the Donors, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795, 1814
(2009) (“Because private foundations typically are funded by a single individual or family, they are far less accountable than colleges and universities . . . . This lack of accounta-
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system of accountability would seem only to offer a partial solution.
Those worried that NGOs serve no single defined master may not be satisfied with a principal master being another form of nonprofit entity that
serves no single defined master. Accordingly, we need a thicker take on
accountability for the nonprofit sector.
In reflecting on the nature of the major anti-NGO criticisms described
in Part II, which often come packaged as accountability concerns, the
critiques are, at bottom, actually grounded in concerns about NGO power
and effectiveness and NGO authenticity and voice. I am not particularly
concerned about the strength of the former criticisms, but I am concerned
about the latter.
Generally, I find NGO power relatively less worrisome for three reasons. First, in comparison with other societal segments, nonprofits do not
seem to have disproportionate power and, if anything, recent increases in
their numbers262 may prove to be an equalizing trend. Some of the discomfort with NGO power appears to be prompted by broader fears of
power shifts toward nonprofits due to the policies they might promote, or
simply a greater sense of comfort with power resting in the hands of private interests (individual or corporate) or governments. To the extent that
anti-NGO sentiments are driven by a sense that NGOs are, in many
ways, simply too effective, too capable of executing and achieving their
missions and making an impact, the thicker conception of accountability
is not undermined. In other words, much of the attack on the “power” of
NGOs charges that people are listening, NGOs are reaching their targeted audiences, and people and institutions with resources are taking
NGOs and their arguments seriously.263
Yet many nonprofit scholars would argue that this is exactly what we
want of nonprofit organizations, that organizational effectiveness is, indeed, a form of accountability (i.e., mission accountability). Furthermore,
international businesses and other financial interests have long attempted
to influence public policy, so NGOs may simply be offering a countervailing perspective. As other sectors become more globalized and transnational, it is understandable that philanthropy too will be transformed,
with nonprofit and public interest associations widening their geographic
scope, with new entities emerging with cross-border concerns or internability magnifies the risk that a private foundation will serve the private, and not the public, good.”).
262. See supra Part I.B.
263. See, e.g., NGO Watch Mission Statement, supra note 110 (indicting NGOs “power and influence” and bemoaning the fact that “NGO officials and their activities are
widely cited in the media and relied upon in congressional testimony; corporations regularly consult with NGOs prior to major investments”).
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tional reach at the core of their organizational identity. Accordingly, these power shifts may remedy past disparities in which other non-state actors, usually representing private financial interests, could operate without effective competition to influence international and transnational policy matters.
Second, concerns about NGO power may be somewhat overstated, especially with respect to local foreign-based NGOs. In her book, Undermining Development: The Absence of Power Among Local NGOs in Africa, Sarah Michael addresses this issue.264 She concludes that local
NGOs active in Africa lack substantial power, which she defines as “the
ability . . . to set their own priorities, define their own agendas and exert
their influence on the international development community, even in the
face of opposition from government, donors, international NGOs and
other development actors.”265 Although power has many different definitions, the ability to control ends or control others is usually considered an
essential marker.266 Governments thus have intrinsic power that others,
such as corporations, individuals, and civil society groups, may only seek
to manipulate using or reacting to government power.267 Even with respect to large international NGOs, there may be some exaggeration at
play. Certainly some NGOs are large and influential—but the revenues,
assets, and annual budgets of the large international nonprofits are considerably smaller than many governments, state-owned oil companies,
sovereign wealth funds, Fortune 500 companies, and other multinational
private businesses.268
264. See SARAH MICHAEL, UNDERMINING DEVELOPMENT: THE ABSENCE OF POWER
AMONG LOCAL NGOS IN AFRICA (2004).
265. Id. at 18.
266. See Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 796 n.85 (providing definitions of
power).
267. See OSBORNE, supra note 12, at 97. But see Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of
Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 656, 658 (2011)
(describing how charities exert “economic and political power over others”).
268. Here is but one set of examples. The smallest of the Fortune 500 list of the
World’s Largest Corporations was Bristol-Myers Squibb. The World’s Largest CorporaJuly
25,
2011,
at
F-5,
available
at
tions,
FORTUNE,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/full_list/index.html. According
to Bristol-Myers Squibb’s most recent annual report, the company has total assets of
$31,076,000,000. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (2011), available at
http://investor.bms.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=106664&p=irol-reportsannual. The Sovereign
Wealth Fund Institute lists the largest sovereign wealth funds, with assets in billions.
Fund Rankings, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/fundrankings/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2012). All but thirteen identify assets as one billion or
more. Id. The World Bank lists 2010 GDPs for 194 countries; of these, only twenty total
less than one billion dollars. Gross Domestic Product 2010, WORLD DEV. INDICATORS
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Third, the power NGOs wield is earned soft power. Professor Joseph
Nye of the Harvard Kennedy School describes power as “the ability to
get the outcomes you want, and to affect the behavior of others to make
this happen.”269 He distinguishes between hard power (coercion) and soft
power (co-optation).270 To the degree that power is regularly exercised
by NGOs, generally it is soft power at work. Nonprofits lack hard power;
they cannot force governments to do things through command, force of
law, significant economic might, or military force. NGOs rely primarily
on the tools of soft power: co-option, attracting people and institutions to
their values, and engendering cooperation. Looking at power in these
terms, lessens the concern about the power of nonprofits because any
(soft) power that might be used by international, domestic, or local
NGOs has likely been earned through expertise, credibility, persuasion,
and effective communication.
The point is not that nonprofit organizations lack power or that they
have not misused power in alarming ways. They do and they have. In
(Dec. 15, 2011), http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/GDP.pdf. The assets
of even major nonprofits are significantly smaller. The top nonprofit on the Philanthropy
400 of 2011 was United Way Worldwide. Philanthropy 400 Data, CHRONICLE OF
PHILANTHROPY, http://philanthropy.com/section/Philanthropy-400/237/ (follow “Full
List” hyperlink) (last visited May 18, 2012). In its annual report of 2010, this nonprofit
listed total assets of a comparatively small $101,144,000. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, UNITED
WAY
WORLDWIDE
27
(2011),
http://unway.3cdn.net/a27979675739418693_mlbrwvl93.pdf. Other multinational nonprofits, while larger than United Way, are still dwarfed by the other categories listed
above. As the Philanthropy 400 focuses on American nonprofits, it is useful to include
some large multinational nonprofits as well, all of which show similarly small asset figures. Save the Children states that its total net assets are $179.24 million. 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT,
SAVE
THE
CHILDREN
14
(2011),
http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0df91d2eba74a%7D/RESULTS-FOR-CHILDREN-Q1Q2-2011.PDF. Doctors Without
Borders lists net assets of $154,615,348. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, DOCTORS WITHOUT
SANS
FRONTIÈRES
63
(2011),
BORDERS/MÉDECINS
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/MSF%202010%20Annual%20Rep
ort.Final.pdf. Greenpeace lists net assets of $9,126,710. 2010/2011 ANNUAL REPORT,
GREENPEACE
27
(2011),
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/planet3/PDFs/ANNUAL_REPORT201011.pdf. Oxfam International lists its total assets at €607 million, or about $787.8 million.
ANNUAL
REPORT,
OXFAM
42
(2011),
2010–11
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oxfam-annual-report-2010-11.pdf.
269. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Hard Power, Soft Power, and “The War on Terrorism,” in
AMERICAN POWER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 114, 117 (David Held & Mathias
Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2004).
270. See JOSEPH S. NYE JR., THE POWERS TO LEAD 37–44 (2008); see also Jenkins, Soft
Power, supra note 14, at 800 (discussing hard and soft power theory).
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fact, some of my prior work has been highly critical of certain exercises
of power in the charitable sector.271 Ultimately, critiques about power
require elaboration and framing. Rather than bemoaning the power of
any group (for-profit or nonprofit), a more enlightened conversation
would focus on how NGO power is manufactured, how it operates on the
ground, and what are its normative ends. For this Article, reflections on
the second of those issues,272 particularly the transparency and inclusivity
of NGO power, has led to conclusions about thick accountability discussed in this Part and donor control discussed below.273
B. Rethinking the Exercise of Donor Control
What remains unsettling in the anti-NGO critiques are the concerns
expressed about authenticity and voice. Whether the argument comes in
the form of challenges to claims of representativeness by people on the
right asking who is really behind those NGOs; or by those on the left
expressing concern about poor and other marginalized citizens being silenced or ill-represented by professionalized, Northern-dominated
NGOs, and questioning whether colonial philanthropy serves Southern or
Northern interests; or by governments that attack or resent the claims of
some NGOs to speak on behalf of citizens yet appear to be predominantly responsive to foreign donors. Beneath all these criticisms and questions lies a common set of concerns about the authenticity and voice of
NGOs. And there may well be something to these criticisms.
Of particular concern, the controlling approach of Northern funders
may be a threat to the authenticity and voice of Southern NGOs.274 As I
have written extensively about elsewhere, the practice of philanthropy
has undergone a problematic shift toward an assertive, donor-controlled
approach to grantmaking.275 Increasingly over the past fifteen years or so,
wealthy philanthropic foundations have focused on responding to legitimate questions and criticisms regarding their own accountability.276
271. See, e.g., Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 818–
20 (criticizing private foundations for interfering with a major local government political
appointment by conditioning millions of dollars in grant funding on a specific appointee
in a written grant agreement).
272. Some of my previous work touches upon how nonprofits manufacture power. See
Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 795–801(discussing nonprofit soft power).
273. See infra Part III.B.
274. See EBRAHIM, supra note 258, at 15 (“A considerable literature on North-South
relations has noted how demands of funders constrain NGO action.”).
275. See Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 761–71
(describing the growth and expansion of funder control in philanthropy).
276. See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY
GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 15–18 (2005); see also
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Driven in part by a desire to prove that they are strategic and accountable, foundations have turned to more muscular approaches to philanthropy marked by high engagement, heavy intervention in grantee affairs,
and extensive demands on grantees.277 These practices have all led to a
pervading sense of donor control over grantee activities.278 This move
toward a more directive and instrumentalist approach to grantmaking is
transforming grant recipients into subordinates who answer to their manager’s control or subcontractors who execute the foundation’s vision.279
Donors also have begun to widely employ metrics, assessment, and
other business principles more commonly used in the for-profit world.280
Although measurement can be used effectively in the social sector, many
are concerned that funders’ overemphasis on metrics is becoming widespread, distorting organizational priorities, and undermining productive
grantor-grantee partnerships.281 Foundations have gone from hoping for
results to partnering for results to demanding results, landing on an alltoo-common carrot-and-stick approach. In recent years, philanthropy has
become a one-way relationship controlled more and more by funders.282
If donors start taking anti-NGO concerns about authenticity and voice
seriously, it might lead foundation trustees and managers to reconsider
certain practices and policies, especially with respect to the current state
of interactions between funder and grant-recipient NGOs. This is especially important in light of the cultural and social divide between Northern funders and Southern NGO grant recipients. Perhaps funders should
begin by asking themselves how their behaviors undermine the grassroots voices and representativeness of NGOs. In particular, those Northern foundations exerting excessive control over grantees, directing activities, and turning Southern NGOs into subcontractors might reconsider

Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-Interested
Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1132 (2001); Brakman
Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 253, at 272.
277. See Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 795–97.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 769–70.
280. See id. at 787–88.
281. See id. at 788–92.
282. See id. at 758–59, 772 (discussing trends in increases of donor control in philanthropic grantor-grantee relationships); Susan A. Ostrander, The Growth of Donor Control: Revisiting the Social Relations of Philanthropy, 36 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY
SECTOR Q. 356, 359 (2007); see also Tom Dannenbaum, The International Criminal
Court, Article 79, and Transitional Justice: The Case For An Independent Trust Fund
For Victims, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 234, 287 (2010) (noting “the demand among donors for
control over the impact of their donations”).
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their approach if they understood that those activities contribute to attacks on the global nonprofit sector.
Concerns about national sovereignty283 and foreign influence in domestic affairs284 will never be completely alleviated, but the perception—
and reality—of excessive outside donor influence only reinforces those
particular fears in cross-border contexts. As donors engage in grantmaking practices that “plac[e] themselves in the driver’s seat to control the
agenda of nonprofit-sector projects,”285 they may diminish the voice of
grant-recipient organizations and the local communities and peoples they
serve. Furthermore, “[t]o the extent that [Northern funders] treat grantees
as subcontractors and dominate”286 local-based NGOs, they create the
appearance of the Global North speaking for the Global South in particularly troubling ways that lack authenticity and transparency. As a result,
donor control lends support to anti-NGO critiques about foreign influence and national sovereignty. Those same behaviors also may support
charges of false representativeness, accusations of neocolonialism, and
claims that international philanthropy supports elite donor interests (e.g.,
culture, values, policy formulation).
Exposing the link between donor control and anti-NGO criticisms reveals an inverse relationship between the donor’s own accountability
pressures and donee accountability. The roots of this new phenomenon
lie in the desire of funders, especially private foundations importing
business principles and standards into philanthropy, to demonstrate their
own mission accountability. In fact, the desire for accountability and impact has provided much of the stated justification for grantmakers to eschew general operating support grants in favor of inflexible, limitedpurpose program support287 and to restrict funding to foundation-initiated
grantmaking initiatives.288 Thus, the prescriptive giving that has become
the hallmark of the strategic philanthropy and philanthrocapitalism
movements is intrinsically linked to the broader new “accountability environment” gripping the social sector.289 Efforts to enhance the accounta283. See supra text accompanying notes 126–30.
284. See supra text described in Part II.C.
285. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 786.
286. Id. at 816.
287. See id. at 777 n.96.
288. See id. at 779 n.101.
289. See LESTER M. SALAMON, THE RESILIENT SECTOR: THE STATE OF NONPROFIT
AMERICA 25 (2003) (describing a challenging “accountability environment” for nonprofit
organizations); Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 771
(“The philanthrocapitalism movement and the broader reinvention of the institution of
philanthropy have implications for lawyering and governance. These shifts in grantmaking practices are in response to a variety of pressures and criticisms of traditional philan-
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bility of private foundations and other funders in the Global North may
have the effect of weakening the accountability and legitimacy of Southern NGOs. Northern zeal for funder accountability (which has led to topdown, prescriptive, controlling grantmaking) may directly undermine
efforts of grant-recipient NGOs to generate their own accountability (i.e.,
downward) and legitimacy (both real and perceived). Although advice
and expertise from the top can be welcome and beneficial, social transformation requires the full participation of citizens and communities,
with philanthropy providing supportive assistance rather than control.
I am not naïve enough to believe that criticism of NGOs or government action designed to curb NGOs would cease around the world if only donors were to loosen the reins of control. They will not. Moreover,
philanthropy’s recent emphasis on exerting extensive donor control
through directive grantmaking shows no signs of abating.290 Both anecdotal evidence291 and my own empirical research292 suggest that foundation-centered and directive models of and practices in philanthropy are
on the rise. Thus, it seems unlikely that foundations will begin to relinquish control in the short term. However, by giving serious consideration
to the implications of the anti-NGO criticisms, perhaps more forwardthinking foundations will come to understand that insistence on controlling the ways in which social problems are solved is deeply problematic.
Besides undermining community-based bottom-up action and silencing
important sources of social innovation,293 foundation efforts to micromanage social problem-solving may hurt grantee recipients. As foundations prioritize their own efforts to prove their own mission accountability and effectiveness, it may come at the expense of their grantees. My
thropy. Thus, philanthrocapitalism and strategic philanthropy have roots . . . in calls for
accountability.”).
290. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 767–69 (discussing the spread of philanthrocapitalism and strategic grantmaking ideas and approaches in charitable giving).
291. See MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM 57–59 (2008);
Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 765–66; TOM DAVID,
THE CAL. WELLNESS FOUND., REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGIC GRANTMAKING 2–3 (2000),
available at http://www.calwellness.org/assets/docs/reflections/nov2000.pdf (presenting
typical comments from nonprofit leaders conveying the “growing gulf between the largest foundations with the most grant dollars to offer and front-line agencies charged with
directly meeting community needs”).
292. See Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 772–86
(documenting widespread grantmaking trends suggestive of “a more foundation-centric
approach to problem solving that muffles the voices of nonprofit organizations working
in the field”).
293. See id. at 796 (arguing that public charities operating on the ground offer rich
sites for social innovation).
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call is for funders to appreciate their opportunity to engage with grantrecipient organizations, including foreign NGOs, in ways that strengthen
NGOs and their international standing, instead of inadvertently handing
the critics more ammunition.
C. U.S.-Based International Programs vs. Overseas Recipients
International philanthropy may be supported in a variety of different
ways. Private foundations may choose to engage in international programming either by making direct cross-border grants to foreign-based
organizations or through indirect support delivered to U.S.-based entities
with operations abroad. Some foundations, seeking fewer administrative
requirements driven by U.S. law, choose the indirect route—providing
“international” support through grants to U.S.-recognized or U.S.-based
charities that conduct their activities outside the United States.294
Anti-NGO concerns about authenticity and voice may encourage foundation trustees and managers to reconsider some of the ways in which
they implement international philanthropy. Specifically, they may reconsider whether to achieve their philanthropic objectives through direct
support of foreign organizations or by channeling funding through U.S.based entities that may or may not work with local partner organizations.
For U.S. private foundations, the burdens of law regulating nonprofit
organizations and the pressures of the anti-terrorist financing regulatory
environment have created disincentives for direct funding of foreign organizations.295 Under Internal Revenue Code section 4942, a private
foundation is required to distribute a minimum percentage of the fair
market value of non-charitable use assets in order to avoid certain federal
excise taxes.296 This is often referred to as the 5% payout requirement.
Foreign grants are considered “qualifying distributions” if they are made
for charitable purposes and the grantor follows one of two detailed and
rigorous procedural processes: equivalency determination or expenditure
responsibility.297 In addition to federal tax requirements, criminal and
civil penalties can be imposed if charitable contributions to foreign charities are used to support or engage in terrorism. Most notably, Executive

294. See Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 804.
295. For a full discussion of the implications of and incentives for U.S. foundations to
prefer funneling “international-related” grants through U.S.-based intermediary organizations instead of making grants directly to foreign-based NGOs, see Jenkins, Soft Power,
supra note 14, at 831–33.
296. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2006).
297. See Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 805–07 (describing equivalency determination and expenditure responsibility requirements).
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Order 13,324,298 the USA Patriot Act,299 and the U.S. Department of
Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices
for U.S.-Based Charities300 have contributed to the sense in the foundation world that direct foreign giving carries greater administrative burdens, cost, and risk.
FIGURE 4. International Giving to U.S.-Based and Overseas Recipients
as a Percentage of All Giving in Grant Dollars, 2006-2008301
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Foundation reliance on U.S. intermediary funders may be efficient for
U.S. funders but it may have the unintended consequence of widening
the distance between the professional cadre of NGOs in the field and the
citizens those organizations serve. An analysis of major grantmaking
expenditures revealed that between 2007 and 2008, support for international giving increased 21.4%.302 The strong growth, however, principally benefited U.S.-based recipients with international programs (a 27%
increase) in comparison with direct support to foreign charities, which
298. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001); see also Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 808–09 (discussing Executive Order 13,324).
299. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006); see also Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at
809–11.
300. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES:
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2006), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicitfinance/Documents/guidelines_charities.pdf; see also Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14,
at 811–14 (discussing the U.S. Department of Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities).
301. These data are drawn from the following sources: FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS
2010, supra note 84, at 26; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 84, at 26,
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2008, supra note 84, at 20.
302. See FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 84, at 26.
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grew at less than half that rate (a 12.3% increase).303 FIGURE 4 shows
that between 2006 and 2008, the most recent three years for which data
are available, the share of overall grant dollars directed to international
purposes increased from 22% to a record 24%. The share of grant dollars
allocated to U.S.-based recipients increased by approximately one-third,
from 12.1% to 16.1%. In contrast, the portion of grant dollars given directly to overseas charities declined by nearly one-sixth, from a record
high of 9.9% down to 8.3%.
Direct cross-border funding by private foundations and by the large international NGOs that choose to partner with (via direct funding to) local
organizations on the ground can help build the capacity of local, sustainable civil organizations abroad, generate social capital, and develop civil
society.304 Political scientist Chip Gagnon has argued that international
NGOs that encourage local actors and local NGOs to determine priorities
and projects and that rely on local expertise are more effective. He
writes:
A review of [international NGO] work suggests that the most effective
international NGOs are those that see their work as a two-way process,
wherein the international agencies help local NGOs to determine their
priorities, and personnel of the international agencies see locals as
equal partners. The most effective strategies are those that integrate
concrete projects and an inclusive decision-making process to build
community and civil society locally, a strategy that allows local actors,
communities, and NGOs to determine priorities, projects, and directions. This seems especially important for international NGOs that are
seeking to strengthen local actors and networks as participants in civil
society.305

Direct overseas grantmaking that is relatively unencumbered can provide local NGOs with the support they need to grow.306 Through thoughtful foreign funding strategies and approaches, perhaps matching funds
that attract local monies, encouraging organizations to develop their own

303. See id.
304. See Jenkins, Soft Power, supra note 14, at 832 (arguing that direct grants to local
foreign NGOs offer advantages with respect to institution-building, social capital, and
civil society).
305. V.P. Gagnon Jr., International NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Attempting to Build
Civil Society, in THE POWER AND LIMITS OF NGOS 207, 208 (Sarah E. Mendelson & John
K. Glenn eds., 2002).
306. See HUDOCK, supra note 38, at 16 (arguing that assistance to Southern NGOs only
strengthens civil society when Southern NGOs build organizational capacity at the grassroots level, involve marginalized and weak populations, and empower citizens) (citation
omitted).
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local capacity, shifting mindset so that they are responsive to Southern
NGOs, Northern funders can assist Southern NGOs in ways that do not
jeopardize their autonomy and credibility.307 Funders can either choose to
help create flourishing, self-sufficient non-Western NGOs less susceptible to many of the more stinging anti-NGO critiques or not.
D. Focusing on the Practice of Philanthropy
Foundations devote few resources and seem to pay little attention to
the practice of philanthropy (i.e., the way foundation grantmaking is
conducted and its effects). Rather, they tend to focus on the execution of
their “core” substantive programs (i.e., their subject-matter priority
fields). With few exceptions,308 most large foundations do not seem to
think that supporting the development of the nonprofit sector should be a
giving priority. This is unfortunate. Another potential lesson from the
rise of the anti-NGO movement is the need to focus on the nonprofit sector infrastructure and to advocate for and defend the sector and its players from attacks.
Individual organizations simply do not have the tools or the resources
to respond to sector-wide critiques or to compete effectively against governments. Although American public trust and support of the nonprofit
sector remains high,309 a close examination of opinion data reveals some
potential weaknesses310 causing concern among supporters of the sector.
An earlier section of this Article discussed the organized, well-financed
efforts underway to discredit nonprofit organizations through public
campaigns.311 In Australia, for example, many of the right-wing criticisms of nonprofits were shared by the conservative government of

307. See id. at 38.
308. For example, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation (MI), the Surdna Foundation
(NY), and The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation maintain active grantmaking portfolios to build a vibrant and independent philanthropic and nonprofit sector. See CHARLES
STEWART MOTT FOUND., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT: BLINDED BY PESSIMISM OR SEEING
POSSIBILITIES
32–37
(2010),
available
at
http://www.mott.org/~/media/pdfs/Publications/AnnualReport/AR2009PDF.ashx;
FOUND.,
2010
ANNUAL
REPORT
9
(2011)
available
at
SURDNA
http://www.surdna.org/images/stories/content_img/2010-surdna_annual_report.pdf; THE
WILLIAM & FLORA HEWLETT FOUND., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.hewlett.org/uploads/files/annual_report/2009_Philanthropy_Program_Report
_to_the_Board.pdf.
309. See EDELMAN, supra note 16, at 11.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 94–99.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 107–24 (discussing AEI’s NGO Watch and
other projects).
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Prime Minister John Howard,312 who served from 1996 to 2007.313 In
addition, governments have used various strategies aimed at weakening
NGOs.314 Many of these challenges and criticisms have targeted the nonprofit sector as a whole. Yet individual NGOs are usually focused on
specific, substantive issues in their specialized area of focus. Therefore,
they are less well-positioned to engage in public diplomacy campaigns at
the macro level.
FIGURE 5. Percentage of Grant Dollars Allocated to Philanthropy and
Voluntarism by Year, 2004-2008315
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FIGURE 5 demonstrates that from 2004 to 2008 the largest U.S. funders
have steadily reduced—as a percentage of overall giving—their grantmaking support for philanthropy and voluntarism.316 Of course there are
many competing societal needs for charitable grant dollars, e.g., education, health, the environment, etc. Moreover, this category may be too
broad to draw precise conclusions about the nature of foundation support
for the sector’s infrastructure. This five-year downward trend, however,
suggests that the philanthropic sector should pay more attention to the
resources it allocates to developing the health of the sector as a whole.
312. See Peter Ellis, The Ethics of Taking Sides, in ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL NGOS: AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHERS AND NGOS, supra note
1, at 65, 69–70 (discussing the prominent, right-wing attacks on NGOs in the Howard
government).
313. See Australia’s Prime Ministers—John Howard, NAT’L ARCHIVES OF AUSTL.,
http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/howard (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
314. See supra Part II.C.
315. These data are drawn from FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 84, at
4.
316. I note, however, that the total value in raw dollars in this particular category has
increased because the total pool of grantmaking dollars (the denominator) has increased
by nearly two-thirds during this period.
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Such support might include resources to defend domestic nonprofits, international organizations, and foreign NGOs from criticism; to educate
and mobilize public opinion in support of NGOs; and to support research, critical self-evaluation, and stakeholder conversations that might
further strengthen the sector and civil society, even if it requires changes
to current institutional arrangements, processes, and norms.
CONCLUSION
I support charitable giving, private foundations, and the global nonprofit sector as forces for positive change. The world needs strong nonprofit institutions, at all levels and all around the globe, for social transformation and to provide organized groups through which aggregate individual voices, views, and interests can be represented.317 What I describe as the anti-NGO movement, a confluence of criticisms from the
right and the left as well as government intrusions and strategies used to
undermine the sector, exposes some of the sector’s vulnerabilities and
challenges. These efforts to de-halo the nonprofit sector threaten the public trust on which the nonprofit sector ultimately depends and are too
important to ignore.
Certainly, some critics conceive of the rise of NGO activity as a threat
or a crisis. Although I do not share that view, some of the arguments
raise legitimate questions worthy of critical examination. NGO funders
should pay careful attention to such concerns and, more important, consider how their own behavior may be contributing to the state of affairs.
Ultimately, private philanthropy (as a form of private action) contributes
to the public good by enhancing problem-solving capacity. But philanthropy does not operate in a vacuum. Private foundations are part of the
civil society ecosystem. Thus NGO concerns are not just the responsibility or the fault of the NGOs themselves. Foundations and other nonprofit
sector donors need to be mindful of how their actions support or undermine their grantees, the ultimate beneficiaries, and the charitable sector
they inhabit. Lately, foundations have been involved in a self-reinvention
project that has gone terribly awry, becoming divorced from the processes of successful social innovation.318 This Article concludes that these
moves may be unintentionally weakening the standing of global NGOs
and giving credence to anti-NGO critiques.
What I take from the anti-NGO movement is not that we should ignore
NGOs, nor that we should not engage in cross-border support. Instead
317. See Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, supra note 85, at 817.
318. See id. at 754–61 (critiquing philanthrocapitalism and the recent trends embracing
business-like, market-driven charitable grantmaking).
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this Article concludes that true NGO accountability is about more than
just responsiveness to funders. It is about being mindful of the fragility
of NGO authenticity and voice, about Northern funders using their
wealth and power to support—not control—social change, and about the
need for the sector to improve public understanding of the “special qualities that make nonprofit organizations worth protecting.”319
Although the “NGO” acronym emphasizes an existence apart from
government, civil society is valuable because it prioritizes collective action, not because it is separate from government. Business is apart from
government, but it does not contribute to civil society. However, if
NGOs are merely subcontractors for Northern funders then they are not
galvanizing citizens in a collaborative endeavor. The anti-NGO movement raises deep and important questions of governance for foundations
and international NGOs that fund foreign-based local NGOs.
Perhaps foundation engagement with and against the anti-NGO
movement can help facilitate new sensitivities, understanding, and practices leading to more autonomy and flexibility for civil society groups
and the citizens working through them. Grantor-grantee relationships
have always been complicated, and the politics of North-South NGO add
new dimensions of complexity. As foundation assets and interest in international philanthropy grow, the anti-NGO movement will grow as
well, unless Northern funders address the problem and their own responsibility for its creation.

319. SALAMON, supra note 289, at 82.

